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N o arm of the sea ha s been, or is of greater
intere st, alike to the ge ologist and archae
olog ist, the historian and geographer, the
merchant, the statesman, and the stu dent o f
strategy, than the inland water known a s the
Per sian Gulf.
Sir Arnold Wil son, 1928

More than ever, the que stion of who contr ol s
what in the Per sian Gulf and the Middle East
is the key to who contr ols what in the world.
Richard M. Nixon, 1980

iii

THE NIXON DOCTRINE:
ITS APPLICATION IN THE ARABIAN GULF
Abdulwahed Al-Mawlawi
Western Michigan University, 1981
Western Europe and Japan have been heavily dependent on Arabian
Gulf oil;

the United States' dependency is growing.

Hence,

the

"security" of this region and consequently the securing of the oil
flow has become a major strategic issue to the Western and particular
ly the U. s. policy makers.

To the U. s., the British "withdrawal" from

the Gulf in 1971 created a strategic "vacuum".

Aggressive arms sales

to the region and the "policeman" role of the Shah of Iran in the Gulf
served as the main U.S. instruments of filling this vacuum.
a direct application of the "Nixon Doctrine".

This was

This Doctrine came as a

direct result of the U.S. failure in Vietnam and of the new international power realignment.

According to the Doctrine, the U.S.

sought to supply arms and assistance to its "threatened" allies and
friends, provided that they assumed the primary responsibility for
providing the necessary manpower.

The Doctrine's main test and

success in the Gulf occurred when thousands of Iranian troops helped
Oman crush the Dhufari Rebellion in 1975.

The triumph of the Iranian

Revolution in 1979 brought the end of this Doctrine in the Gulf.

This

was due mainly to the U. s. failure to foresee the collapse of the
Shah, and the failure to grasp the complexities of Arab and Iranian
politics.
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INTRODUCTION
An accident of geology and an appetite for energy have made the
Arabian

(Persian)

Gulf region

(Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman,

Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iran) a focus of worldwide
interest.

Conservative figures show that by 1970, the eight Gulf

oil-producers exported about 80 percent of the Japanese oil needs, 70
percent of Western Europe's needs, and 5 percent of United States oil
needs.

Thus, the Gulf's oil has become the blood stream of Western

Europe and Japan's industries.

This has put the Gulf at the top of

the list for the Western and, accordingly, United States policy
makers.

Hence, "stability" of the region to secure the oil flow has

been a very major concern for Western Europe, Japan, and mainly the
United States.
Great Britain has a long history of hegemony in the Gulf through
her commercial interests.

This hegemony lasted for 150 years and

ended in 1971 when a 1968 Labor Government decision was implemented to
"phase-out" the British presence "East of Suez."

The United States

Government "feared" that the British withdrawal created a "vacuum"
that could invite a Soviet presence or a radical political subversion.
The unsuccessful experience in Vietnam, coupled with domestic
pressures

against

U.S.

direct

participation

in Vietnam-type wars

prevented the U.S. from filling this vacuum directly.

However, in the

spirit of the "Nixon Doctrine," Iran, and to a lesser degree, Saudi
Arabia, were chosen to play the major roles in "maintaining stability"
in the Gulf.

1
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The Doctrine, in the words of Richard Nixon (1980):
provided that the United States would supply arms and assis
tance to nations threatened by aggression, if they were
willing to assume the primary responsibility for providing
the manpower necessary for their defense. (p. 197)
Agressive arms sales in the Gulf and the "policeman" role of the
Shah in the region served as the two main instruments for the imple
mentation of the Doctrine in the Gulf.
through the Shah, in Oman.

The Doctrine was first tested,

The aim was to protect Sultan Qabus bin

Said from the "scientific-socialist" Popular Front for the Liberation
of Oman (PFLO), which in 1965 led a rebellion in the province of
Dhufar.
The Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf,

however,

lasted only until

1979, when its main instrument, the Shah was deposed by the Iranian
revolution.
It will be the purpose of this thesis to study the application of
the Nixon Doctrine in a vital area of the world, namely the Arabian
Gulf.
In carrying out this task, the thesis will address itself to
a number of questions:
1.

What roles do doctrines play in the United States foreign
policy?

2.

How did the Nixon Doctrine develop?

3.

How did the U.S. perceive its interests in the Gulf?
threats to them?

4.

What were the main principles of the U.S. policy in the Gulf?

5.

What means and tools did the U.S. use in its implementation
of the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf?

and the

3

6.

How was the Doctrine put to the test in Oman?

7.

Why did the Doctrine fail in the Gulf?

In addressing these questions,

several historical backgrounds

will be presented to illuminate the context.
It became evident to this researcher that the usable sources for
this study are very limited due to two factors�
a relatively current one.

First, the subject is

Second, due to the sensitive nature of this

subject to the U.S. and to the states of the Gulf, there is a paucity
of valuable research material, such as primary sources.

This has led

to the use of more secondary sources than desired.
The primary sources are derived mainly from:
main actors of the Doctrine,

the works of the

namely Richard M. Nixon,

Henry A.

Kissinger, and Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran; Congressional
hearings; articles written by some former "on-the-scene" actors of the
Nixon Doctrine.
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DOCTRINES AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
The idea of an explicit foreign policy "doctrine" grew slowly in
American history.
trine" of 1823.

The term derives from the so-called "Monroe Doc
But there is little reason to believe that President

James Monroe consciously intended a permanent policy statement when he
announced to the Congress that the U. s.

would not accept extra-

American intervention in the Eastern Hemisphere.

Dexter Perkins

(1955), however, made a convincing case in his book,! History of the
Monroe Doctrine,
unreal.

1823-1926, that the dangers envisioned had been

Monroe's declaration attained doctrine stature in 1845 when

President James Polk inaugurated the precedent of citing it in diplo
matic

controversy

to give

his

position an aura of venerability.

Nevertheless, Monroe (and Polk) set what has become the basic method
of establishing a foreign policy position which has been adhered to
since.
During the century after Polk, fundamental foreign policy posi
tions were usually named "policies" -- the Open Door Policy, the Good
Neighbor Policy -- but the difference is only in the word.

Following

World War II, the fashion began of identifying foreign policy "doc
trines" by Presidents' names:

the "Truman Doctrine," the "Eisenhower

Doctrine," the "Kennedy Doctrine."
commentators and
question.

But this labeling was done by

journalists, not explicitly by the President

President Nixon (1971), however, broke new ground.

in

For the

first time a President explicitly stated and labeled a "doctrine" from
the beginning and, moreover, demanded a policy embodying "a coherent
4
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vision of the world and a rational conception of America's interests"
(p. 5).

What is a "Doctrine"?
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a doctrine is a
statement of "principle of policy," that is, something larger and
broader than "mere" policy.
A doctrine is a flexible context within which specific policies
are developed.

The evolution of the Monroe Doctrine is the best

example of how a doctrine can be modified and reinterpreted.

The

Monroe Doctrine had originally been aimed to prevent the intervention
of European powers in the New World, but was interpreted by Theodore
Roosevelt as a justification for the intervention of the U.S. to
prevent conditions which might tend to invite extra-American interven
tion.

The Roosevelt Corollary led to the coersion of the very states

it intended to protect, and was thus used to justify establishment and
maintenance of control by the U.S. over governments of Latin America.
As President Nixon (1971, P• 5) has noted, the "Nixon Doctrine"
is a modification of the "Truman Doctrine" of containment of communism
through means that could include U.S. military action, if necessary.
The Eisenhower Doctrine was an earlier modification.
How Do Doctrines Shape Policy?
All U.S. Doctrines have been unilateral statements of purpose by
U.S.

Presidents

based upon

the

generally

recognized

Presidential

prerogative to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States.

They
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have, of course, no validity in law and are not legally binding on any
American.

But, because they are published abroad and will be accepted

and acted upon by foreign powers as definite statements of American
purpose, the U.S. loses credibility if it fails to adhere to its
stated doctrines or violates them without notice.

Since the estab-

lishment of a doctrine is an American action, the U.S. has the right
to interpret its own intent.

Needless to say, the interest of the

U.S. in harmony and stability requires that its principles of policy
be clearly understood abroad.
Doctrines are important as statements of intention directed to
foreign contries, but usually the internal purposes of doctrines are
fa� more important.

Sociologists and politicians have long understood

that leading large numbers of people in a common direction requires
clear, simple, salient statements of purpose.
slogans,

are

prerequisite

to

coherence

and

Such statements, or
continuity in public

support for, or assent to, foreign policy -- particularly in a democracy.

Likewise, such statements are crucial as axioms which make

governmental actions coherent and reasonably continuous by guiding
lower level policy decisions.

Modern governments are huge bureau-

cracies facing decisions that involve thousands of disparate special
ties; their decisions can be made relatively coherent only by being
based on clear, simple, concise statements of the government's axio
matic policy assumptions.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE
As the result of its unsuccessful experience in Vietnam, the U.S.
was awakened to discover that other nations within the capitalist and
communist spheres had expanded their economies at record rates while
acquiring the latest military hardware.

Only now can we begin to

appreciate the magnitude of power realignments that have taken place
over the past fifteen years. Whereas once it was common to define all
international crises in terms of the great-power struggle between the
United States and the Soviet Union, today most analysts agree that
this bipolar balance has given way to a multipower world in which five
"key world power centers" -- China, Japan, Western Europe, the Soviet
Union, and the United States -- figure in the global power equation.
The new world balance of power was further complicated by the
presence of crucial new parameters:

the international currency

crisis; trade rivalries within the Western-Industrial camp; the SinoSoviet dispute; competition for energy supplies; etc.

Futhermore,

the growth of new sub-regional powers (many of them armed with the
latest European or American armaments) like Iran, Israel, India, and
Brazil, further complicates the situation.
President Nixon (1971) painted the landscape of international
relations in his report to Congress:
The postwar order of international relations -- the confi
guration of power that emerged from the Second World War -
is gone. With it are gone the conditions which have deter
mined the assumptions and practice of United States foreign
policy since 1945.
No single sudden upheaval marked the end of the post-war
era in the way that the World Wars of this century shattered
7
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the prewar orders of international relations.
But the
cumulative change since 1945 is profound nonetheless:
--Western Europe and Japan, nations physically or psy
chologically debilitated by the war, have regained
their economic vitality, social cohesion, and politi
cal self-assurance. Their new vigor transforms our
relationship into a more balanced and dynamic coali
tion of independent states.
-New
nations have found identity and self-confidence
and are acting autonomously on the world stage. They
are able to shoulder more responsibility for their own
security and well-being.
--In the last 20 years, the nature of the Communist
challenge has been transformed.
The Stalinist bloc
has fragmented into competing centers of doctrine and
power.
One of the deepest conflicts in the world
today is between Communist China and the Soviet Union.
The most prevalent Communist threats now are not
massive military invasions, but a more subtle mix of
military, psychological, and political pressures.
These developments complicate the patterns of diplo
macy, presenting both new problems and new prospects.
--At the same time, the Soviet Union has expanded its
military power on a global scale and has moved from an
inferior status in strategic weapons to one comparable
to the United States.
This shift in the military
equation has changed both defense doctrines and the
context of diplomacy.
--Around the globe, East and West, the rigid bipolar
world of the 1940's and 1950's has given way to the
fluidity of a new era of multilateral diplomacy.
Fifty-one nations joined the United Nations at its
founding in 1945; today 127 are members. It is an
increasingly heterogeneous and complex world, and the
dangers of local conflict are magnified. But so, too,
are the opportunities for creative diplomacy.
--Increasingly we see new issues that transcend geogra
phic and ideological borders and confront the world
community of nations. Many flow from the nature of
modern technology. They reflect a shrinking globe and
expanding interdependence. They include the challen
ges of exploring new frontiers of space and sea and
the dangers of polluting the planet.
These global
issues call for a new dimension of international
cooperation. (pp. 3-5)
Despite these changes and uncertainties,

U.S. foreign policy

objectives remained essentially unchanged over the past three decades.
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The principal objectives have been,

and will continue to be, the

maintenance of the U.S. position as the world's paramount military and
economic power, and the intensification of U. s. control over foreign
markets and sources of raw materials (particularly energy sources).
This

U.S.

"Thus,

predominance was evident

while lowering

our

in

Nixon's

overseas presence

and

(1971) assertion:
direct

military

involvement, our new policy calls for a new form of leadership, not
abdication of leadership" (p. 17).
These objectives require, in turn, the containment of Soviet
power and influence (the U.S.S.R. being considered the most potent
threat to U.S. world supremacy), the continued leadership of its
allies (particularly West Europe and Japan), and the prevention or
defeat of national upheavals in the Third World countries.

While U.S.

ojectives remain dynamically constant, however, the means available to
attain

them are

continually

diminishing.

Economically

exports have long ceased to dominate world trade.

the

U.S.

In the military

arena, the erosion of U.S. leverage was even more pronounced:
although the United States was still stronger militarily than any
other single power (or than most combinations of two or three powers),
it had to be prepared to face a situation in which it could wind up on
the weaker side of a world power realignment.

Chairman of the Chiefs

of Staff Admiral Thomas H. Moorer noted:
Our relative military power throughout the world has peaked
and is declining.
We no longer possess that substantial
military superiority which in the past provided us with such
a significant margin of overall military power that we
could, with confidence, protect out interests worldwide.
Henceforth, we will have to chart out our course with much
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greater precision and calcu lat e our risks much
cautiously. (Foreign Assistance, 1972, PP• 881-881)

more

In response to the changing domestic and international environ
ment, American policy-makers sought new instruments of influence and
power in order to prevent
negotiating

u.s.s.R.,

a

(SALT)

Arms Limitation Agreement

By

with

the

the Nixon Administration helped to slow down the strategic

arms race
Creation

Strategic

further reductions in U.S. leverage.

while
of

an

preserving America's

all-volunteer

army

lead

and

in

strategic

reductions in

weaponry.

overseas

troop deployments neutralized much anti-military sentiment

s.

U.

at home,

while acquisition of new jumbo transport jets and added naval attack
forces

assured

a

continued

U.S.

capability

to

intervene

abroad.

Military assistance and arms sales rose spectacularly to insure that
client regimes would retain sufficient muscle to stay in power even
after

the

withdrawal

of

U.S.

expeditionary

forces.

Such military

programs were complemented by various economic, political, and diplo
matic measures designed

to provide U.

s.

policy-makers with a wider

spectrum of options with which to pursue U.S. objectives.
for instance,
of

economic

deliveries

In Chile,

the Nixon Administration employed a subtle combination
(aid

cut-offs,

a

machine

parts,

etc.)

warfare
of

key

credit
and

blockade,
political

freezes

on

intrigue

to

paralyze the Allende government while encouraging its
(especially those in the armed forces).
was employed during the

Inda-Pakistani

opponents

A similar "mix" of tactics
war of

1971 to preserve the

U.S. alliance with Pakistan while at the same time avoiding an irreconcilable breach with India.

On a larger scale,

the approach was
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most evident in the diplomacy of detente:

by reopening ties with the

People's Republic of China, and collaborating with the Soviet Union in
the containment of local disputes, the Nixon Administration succeeded
in bringing U. s.
actual

balance

foreign policy into a better alignment with the

of

world

power,

permitting

a

more pragmatic and

economical expenditure of foreign policy resources.

At the same time,

of course, the Washington was pursuing various diplomatic and
political maneuvers designed to use the Sino-Soviet split in
compelling these two countries to dissipate their own military
resources and thus to reduce their capacity to offset U.S. involements
elsewhere.

(See Barnett, 1972, pp. 14-18; Kolko, 1973, pp. 8-17 for

discussion.)
Nixon's new tactical initiatives were formally summarized in what
has come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine.

When first promulgated in

July 1969, the Nixon Doctrine called for the gradual withdrawal of
U.S. combat forces from Asia and the assumption of a "forward defense"
role by the ground forces of U.S. clients, liberally supported by U.S.
air and naval forces (Brodine & Selden, 1972).

Nixon explained this

new theme in his address to the U. s. Congress in his 1970 "State of
the World" address.

As he explained in "New Strategy for Peace,"

Nixon (1970) asserted:
Its central thesis is that the United States will partici
pate in the defense and development of allies and friends,
but that America cannot and will not conceive all the plans,
design all the programs, execute all the decisions, and
undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world.
We will help where it makes a difference and is considered
in our interest • • • we shall furnish military and economic
assistance when requested and as appropriate, but we shall

I

'

I

I
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look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary
responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.
(pp. 55-56)
The three key elements of the Nixon Doctrine are:
First, the United States will keep all of its treaty connnit
ments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power
threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a
nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall
furnish military and economic assistance when requested in
accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look
to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary
responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.
(Nixon, 1979, pp. 12-14)
The Nixon Doctrine therefore, shifted the U.S. role from fighting
on behalf of an embattled regime, as in Vietnam, to providing massive
military aid and training, to be supplemented, if necessary, by U.S.
air and naval power.
World allies was

The image of future U.S. relations with Third

embodied in the "Vietnamization" phase of U.S.

involvement in Indo-China.

In this context,

Nixon and Kissinger

sought "special relationships" with key governments in the Third
World.

The idea was to make these governments junior partners in the

heavy work of imperial management.

Thus the idea of "regional super

power" was born, and Iran, along with Brazil, Indonesia and Israel,
became prime candidates.
By 1972 the Doctrine had been given a much wider interpretation:
instead of applying it merely to Asia, it had been extended to the
entire globe; and instead of referring exclusively to military
resources and options, it encompassed the whole spectrum of foreign
policy operations.

As Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird (1972),

stated, "The Nixon Doctrine and its supporting strategy

provide
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the United States with a strategy that encompasses our relationships
with all nations"

(p. 7 ).

And also as stated by Deputy Defense

Secretary William P. Clements, Jr. in a 1973 appearance before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Nixon Doctrine incorporated three
basic principles:
(1) partnership with friendly nations in which the obliga
tions, as well as the benefits, of peace are equitably
shared; (2) a sufficiency of overall military strength, both
U.S. and allies, in relation to that of others; (3) a will
ingness, in company with our friends, to negotiate in order
to seek solutions to the underlying causes that lead to
conflict. (Mutual Development, 1973, p. 108)

Stated in more pragmatic terms, the revised Doctrine envisioned
the United States at the center of a whole new galaxy of power rela
tionships and alliances in which armed combat would be delegated,
insofar as is possible, to the weaker and poorer nations while detente
and

collaboration

would

govern

relations

between

the richer and

stronger nations (including those in the Communist bloc).

THE GULF:

AN OVERVIEW

Beginnings
The Arabian Gulf was of considerable importance to British mer
cantile interests.

Although most of its activities were in the Indian

subcontinent and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), the British East India Company
was interested in the Gulf as a communication route, as the major
access location to Persian silk and other products, as a market for
British manufacturers, and as an area which had to be controlled if
the routes used by the ships of the Company and its clients were to be
secure.

Thus, from 1616 until 1858 the British East India Company

established and maintained an increasing number of trading stations
and ultimately a fleet of well-armed ships in the Gulf.

The system of

political tactics and relations developed by the British over the
course of some three centuries was crowned by the "Special Treaty"
system with each sheikh (Bahrain in 1880 and 1892, the Trucial tribal
ities in 1892, Kuwait in 1899 and Qatar in 1916 ) (Kelly, 1962; Busch,
1967).

Under this system,

the ruler surrendered external sovereignty to the United
Kingdom and accepted a non-alienation bond pledging not to
cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any
part of his land except to the British government. Between
1913 and 1922 the bonds were reinforced by explicit under
takings not to issue oil concessions without prior British
endorsement. (Hurewitz, 1974, p. 19)
These means of control gave the British Empire exclusive powers
in the Gulf in the key early decades of oil exploration and develop
ment in this century.
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The British East India Company's founding Charter of 1600 granted
it "many exclusive privileges," primarily the monopoly of

Indian

trade, with the power to prohibit "others of the community" from
operating within its area except when licensed to do so
Company.

by the

The Charter was periodically renewed and in 1661, the

Company was granted the power to make peace or war with any ruler who
was not a Christian.
The events of the Seven Years' War [1756-1763] transformed
the East India Company from a commercial into a military and
territorial power. It was then that the foundation was laid
of the present British Empire in the East. (Marx & Engels,
1972, P• 46)
This clause was revoked after the Company had fulfilled its
mercenary function -- the 1793 Charter reserved to the Crown the power
to declare war or to enter into treaties.
By the

beginning of the

eighteenth century, the East India

Company had consolidated its monopoly of East India trade and was the
largest and most powerful of all the English trading organizations.
The Directorate, located in London, was a "closed oligarchy dominated
by a

small group whose ranks were seldom broken save by death"

(Furber, 1948, PP• 11-12).
British presence in the Gulf dates from early in the seventeenth
century when it helped eliminate Portuguese domination of the area.
Early in the sixteenth century the Portuguese fleet sailed into the
Gulf and captured the Island of Hormuz from which they commanded the
whole of the Gulf.

Portuguese sovereignty entailed outright conquest,

exaction of tribute and control of customs.

Forts were built and

17
garrisons established at strategic points in the Gulf.

Repeated

revolts of the local peoples against Portuguese rule during the six
teenth century were unsuccessful; even the powerful Ottoman Empire
could not disloge them.

Toward the end of the century, however, the

Dutch and British appeared, negotiating for commercial trading privi
leges.

Unlike the Portuguese whose undisguised intent was to estab

lish an empire,

these Europeans presented themselves as "peaceful

traders" seeking no more than commercial trading privileges from the
indigenous rulers.
In 1619, the British East India Company had established a ware
house on the Persian coast near Hormuz, but the Portuguese presence
prevented further expansion in the Gulf.

Meanwhile, Shah Abbas of

Persia had been moving steadily to prevent Portuguese domination of
Persia's Gulf coast.

The Shah obtained armed ships from the East

India Company with which he attacked and finally drove the Portuguese
from their stronghold on Hormuz in 1622.
power in the area declined rapidly.

From that time, Portuguese

In turn for their aid, the East

India Company secured exceptional trading privileges,

including a

monopoly of Persian silk and a share in the custom duties of the port.
In the Gulf, the Company had to deal with not only the Persian Shah,
but also the Ottoman Empire via its governor at Basra, and the various
local tribes on the Arab coast.
By the end of the eighteenth century, most of the tribal groups,
which at present form ruling families, had established control over
certain regions of the Gulf and had begun to compete with each other

18
for control of the pearl fishery and trade of the Gulf .

Ships were

the essential strategic resource for maintaining control of the Gulf
Although the Arabs

and they were attacked and captured when possible.
usually avoided the well-armed,

long-distance vessels of the East

India Company which sailed between the East and London, the "country
traders" sailing between Indian ports and the Gulf and often owned by
English merchants under license of the Company were vulnerable to
attack as competitors.

Thus,

relations between British and Arab

interests became increasingly hostile.
Political instability of the area prevailed in spite of the
presence of the East India Company and the diffusion of political
authority among a number of sheikhs.

Each sheikh exercised power over

a relatively small geographic area.

The result was a power vacuum and

in the eighteenth century piracy began to florish with greater than
usual vigor.
early

Thus, the major issue during the late eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries was "piracy"

various Arab sheikhs.

against

British ships by

Dominant among the "pirates" was the Qawasim

tribal federation, located on both sides of the Gulf but whose major
port was Ras al-Khaima.

After several attempts, the British finally

defeated the Qawasim, and concluded the Treaty of Peace in 1820.

From

then on, British ships and forces were stationed in the Gulf to "maintain order" and to protect British commerce.

The treaty did not

prohibit wars among the Arab tribes and economic activity continued to
be disrupted by local tribes competing to expand their influence.
Thus, in 1835 and again in 1853, a Maritime Truce was signed by the
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British Government and local leaders of the Gulf Coast.

This treaty

of peace established a permanent truce at sea in the area, and the
small city-states that were identified in the document became known as
the Trucial States.

This name continued in use until the formation of

the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971.
Dhabi,

Dubai,

Sharjah,

Ajman, Umm

The UAE is comprised of Abu

al-Qaiwain,

Ras al-Khaimah and

Fujairah.
This Pax Britannica had the effect of freezing the position
as it then was and descendants of five Shaikhs who signed
the Perpetual Maritime Truce [ 1853] are still independent
Rulers of States, although two of them rule over little more
than one village each. (Hay, 1959, p. 14)
As a result of the 1853 Truce and treaties signed with Kuwait,
Bahrain, and the Trucial States in the late nineteenth century, and
with Qatar in 1916, the British established exclusive control over the
foreign affairs of these states, and London also enjoyed considerable
influence over their domestic affairs.

A British agent lived in every

important port as advisor to the ruling Sheikh and he maintained a
vigilant collection of information on all commercial and political
activities.

The duties of the British Political Resident of the Gulf

and of the local Political Agents included offering "constant advise
and encouragement" to local rulers, the administration of justice,
safeguarding the interests of sterling and British trade, "encouraging
the development of eduction on the right lives," and negotiations for
new agreements or for changes in those existing "to make sure that
nothing is denied which will seriously effect the position of the
rulers or the British Government (Hay, 1959, pp. 19-24).
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During the 1830s, the fear of a Russian approach to India first
became manifest.

The importance of the Gulf in relation to the

Russian movement into Iraq or Iran was evident.
Nineteenth Century,
Bahrain.

Until the end of the

the British influence reached only as far as

The Arabian mainland beyond Trucial Oman was outside the

scope of British control.

This was changed in 1899

by

a non

alienation agreement with Kuwait which had the objective of preventing
Russia, and, to a lesser extent, Germany, from gaining a position on
the Gulf shore.

This agreement did affect Ottoman suzerainty; Ottoman

claims to the northwest coast of the Gulf were not contested.

In 1913

however, the so-called Blue Line Agreement divided Ottoman and British
spheres in Arabia at a point south of Ugair.

At the insistence of the

Indian Government, Qatar was placed for the first time under British
control because an Ottoman garrison had been stationed in Doha after
the expiration of an 1869 agreement allowing for Ottoman existence.
In 1916, Qatar was brought under an agreement similar to those with
the Trucial States and Bahrain.
The Indian Government had won the argument with London as to the
policy to be pursued in Kuwait and Bahrain, but it lost a more signi
ficant contest in relation to the Persian coast.

In his statement of

May 5, 1903, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, had stated that
Britain would view "the establishment of a naval base or of a forti
fied point in the Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to
British interests" (Busch, 1967, p. 186).

Yet the Indian Government

was overridden by the Colonial office when the Anglo-Russian agreement
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of 1907 placed the whole of the Iranian shore of the Gulf, with the
exception of Bandar Abbas, in the neutral not the British zone.

There

was no recognition of Britain's special position in the Gulf and it
became clear that Britain would not oppose an ultimate Russian outlet
in the Gulf.
The First World War brought important changes in the situation in
the Gulf.

The Ottoman power was finally removed from the area.

passed under British control;
Wahhabi state in 1913.
a time, removed.

Iraq

Al Hasa had already fallen to the

The dangers from Russia and Germany were, for

Soviet hopes of revolution in Iran during the period

immediately following the October Revolution were disappointed and the
renewed Soviet interest and support for popular front movements during
the mid-1920s also came to nothing.

German interests were not a real

factor in the immediate Gulf area in the late 1930s.

The same could

be said for the Italians whose ambitions were concentrated in the Red
Sea area.

Thus, Britain became supreme throughout the entire length

of the Gulf.
British supremacy lasted until the end of World War II.
1945 it declined rapidly in all the peripheral areas.

After

First, and most

importantly, the great pillar of the British position in the Gulf,
India,

achieved independence in 1947.

Second,

Britain could not

afford the cost of maintaining supremacy in other parts of the Middle
East.

After World War I I the British withdrew from Palestine and

Egypt; they lost their influence in Jordan and Iraq.

They no longer

had the ability to defend Iran against the U.S.S.R.

Finally, Great
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Britain was forced to withdraw from Aden.

In 1961, Britain dropped

her claim to protect Kuwait and her subsequent action in sending
troops to meet the threat from Iraq may have been the last assertion
of British paramountcy in the Gulf.
This historical survey demonstrates that although Britain's
influence in the Gulf dates from the early Seventeenth Century, her
supremacy in the southern part dates only from the first half of the
Nineteenth Century.

Her domination over the whole area lasted only a

short time -- from 1914 to the 195Os -- and relied more on the absence
of rivals than on the ability or willingness of Britain to assert her
power.

There was no real base in the Gulf until the construction of

naval facilities at Bahrain in 1935.

Britain's influence was limited

to securing navigation of the Gulf against immediate and prospective
threats to her commercial lines.

When oil in Iran and Iraq became a

major interest, British supremacy in the Gulf was already virtually
established.

With the ending of the British Empire in India, oil

became the major British interest in the Gulf.
this change was not immediately apparent.

The significance of

Britain did not show much

interest in developing sources of oil in areas immediately under her
control.

The

Bahrain

and

Saudi

fields were developed by

U.S.

interests while, as the events of 1951 in Iran showed, the British
position in the Gulf was unable to assure control of her traditional
Middle Eastern sources.

But in the nine Gulf sheikhdoms and Oman, the

British military and political presence was still considered a major
"stabilizing" force.

l

On January 16, 1968,

British Prime Minister
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Harold Wilson announced the final British withdrawal from the Gulf
area by 1971.
After 150 years, the British were relinquishing their security
role.

With the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, Britain no

longer needed forces in the Gulf to protect her imperial communica
tions to the east.

At the same time, a new imperative for Gulf

security had arisen:

oil.

By 1968, the Labor Party, then in power,

concluded that Britain's oil interests would not be seriously threat
ened by the British withdrawal.

Recalling the difficulties surround

ing the British withdrawal from Aden in 1967, the Labor Party conclud
ed that it was better to leave before a radical nationalist movement
forced them out.
Importance of the Gulf
Historically, the Arabian Gulf was important mainly as a part of
the British lifeline to India.

Since the discovery of oil in the

1930s, however, the Gulf has acquired a new significance.
Oil
Oil has been considered the most political of all commodities
moving in international commerce.

Recent experience in the Middle

East and particularly since 1973 (Arab production cutbacks,

price

hikes, a five month oil embargo, ruptures in the Atlantic Alliance, a
scramble for alternative energy supplies) more than justifies this
view.
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The Gulf region has become significanct to the world community,
particularly the great powers, because of the vast petroleum resources
discovered over the last forty years.

Petroleum production of the

littoral states has increased enormously, while the dependence of the
industrialized world on Arabian Gulf oil has grown (see Appendices A
and B).
The reasons for the especially rapid growth in the demand for oil
are numerous, but one overwhelming fact dominated:

the cost of pro

ducing oil was much lower than the cost of producing practically any
other source of energy.

When oil could be produced at ten or twenty

cents a barrel, as it could in a large part of the Middle East, no
other source of energy could compete.

The selling price of the

world's oil reflected much more than ten or twenty cents of production
cost.
Oil is unique among the world's commodities.
which is plentiful and yet exhaustible.

It is a resource

It is largely concentrated in

the Middle East, not only an area of traditional strategic importance
and great power rivalries, but also one which provides the locale for
some of the most persistent international conflicts.
The Gulf area is considered to hold 50 percent of the world's oil
"proven reserves" (ten times those of the U.S.).

It also accounts for

60 percent of all oil moving into international trade (The Economic
Intelligence, 1976, p. l; also see Appendices C and D for data).
Figures for world dependence on the Gulf oil do differ a little,
but in general they are very high (see Appendix E ).

l

Conservative
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figures show that:
The three biggest oil consumers, the U.S., Western Europe
and Japan, together accounted for 38 million barrels a day,
about two-thirds of the world total.
Proportionately,
Japan's dependence was heaviest. Oil supplied 80 percent of
all Japanese energy requirements; virtually 100 percent of
this oil (5.4 million barrels a day) had to imported; and 76
percent of the imports came from the Persian [Arabian] Gulf.
Roughly 64 percent of Western Europe's energy needs were met
by oil; nearly all of the 15.2 million barrels a day it
burned were imported and 68 percent of the imports were of
Persian Gulf origin. The U.S. was the biggest oil consumer,
but the 16.8 million barrels a day we burned represented
only 47 percent of our total energy consumption.
We
imported close to 37 percent of our oil in 1973, but the
bulk came from Caribbean and Canadian sources. Only 13.5
percent of our imports -- 5 percent of all oil we burned -
came from the Persian Gulf. (Foreign Policy, 1975, p. 72)
Europe and Japan will continue to be heavily dependent upon Gulf
oil.

The U.S. is expected to be more dependent on Middle East oil,

totaling approximately 25 percent of its oil imports.

The Soviet

Union's interest in the Gulf oil countries is also increasing.

It is

probable that with greatly increased industrial need, the communist
bloc will become a net importer of oil from beyond communist Eurasia.
The control of oil prices passed from foreign concessionaires to
indigenous national authorities in the oil-producing countries only
after October 1973.

Until then, the "big seven" oil companies (five

American, one British and one Anglo-Dutch) dominated the industry by
their ownership of most of the world's low-cost oil and by their
vertical expansion into refining, transportation, and marketing.
Economic
By 1978, as the result of periodic raises in the price of oil --
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especially

since

late

1973

by

the Organization

of Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Gulf states accumulated a revenue that
amounted to over $85 billion (see Appendices E, G and H).
for 1981 are substantially higher.

Revenues

Saudi Arabia alone is expected to

reach $123.5 billion in oil revenues (Gupte, 1981, p. Al).

This newly

acquired wealth has placed the Gulf countries among the main actors of
the international economic system.
Strategic
The strategic significance of the Arabian Gulf is two-fold:
communications and oil.

This significance as a highway and as a

doorway has been apparent throughout history, but unmistakeably so
since the growth and flowering of Britain's eastern empire.

Britain's

ability to command the Gulf checked the Middle Eastern designs of
Russia and Iran.

Britain's power also contained Ottoman and Egyptian

forces and kept at bay the European powers in their drives toward the
east.

All these checkmates were played on the Indian chessboard since

Basra, Iraq, was in effect the backdoor to Bombay.

A threat to India

and Pakistan was also a threat to the Commonwealth.
Today the Gulf is one of the great channels for international air
communication between Europe and South Asia, and between the Soviet
Union and the Indian Ocean.
using these routes.

Overflying rights are important to all

As a channel, the Gulf is vital for the export of

oil and its narrow mouth, the Strait of Hormuz, is a choke-point for
the external trade of all its inhabitants.
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Strategically, the Gulf offers an avenue through which Soviet
power, apart from its immediate significance in the Middle East, might
hope to flank the African continent on the one hand and the Indian
subcontinent on the other.

The Kremlin would like to establish a

permanent and effective naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Oil, of course, has great strategic implications of its own.

At

this point, it is sufficient to say that Middle East oil, proceeding
mainly via the Gulf, is still, and long will be, the noncommunist
world's main source of supply.

Denial of this supply of oil in times

of emergency or war would have profound consequences on world power
balances.

Oil is also the principal basis for commerce between

Western Europe and the Gulf states.

Thus the. interruption of this

activity would be harmful for the former and disastrous for the
latter.
The waters of the Gulf have a fundamentally simple military and
strategic aspect.

Twenty-six miles of island-studded water separates

Arabia from Iran at the Strait of Hormuz.

To seal that entrance, or

to deny the movement of shipping within, is relatively easy.

The Gulf

would thus be made into a lake with no communication to the outside
world.

In this sense, command of the Gulf waters implies command of

the entire littoral.

Thus the Gulf has become vital to world powers

and particularly to the United States.

The State Department stated

that "in terms of the global U.S. strategic positions, we clearly have
a strong interest in maintaining cooperative relations with the states
of the Gulf" (U.S. Interests, 1972, p. 141).
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Because the Persian Gulf is important, the argument has been
propounded that it is, in effect, the eastern flank of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Western forces on the Gulf are

as essential to Europe and the United States as they are on the Rhine.
Threats to the Status-Quo
The British Presence
Bec ause the Gulf provided oil, the life-blood of Western
industry, Britain did not follow its departure from the other Arab
countries with that from the Gulf.

This lingering British presence

was in contrast to the decolonization process that was taking place in
the whole of the Arab world during the 1950s.

The revolution of 1952

in Egypt led by Gama! Abdul-Nasser, the Algerian revolt of 1954, and
Iraq's revolution of 1958 are only a few examples of that process.
This decolonization politicized and tended to radicalize the Arab
world.
Britain, and later the U.S., continued to exploit Gulf oil by
preventing it from falling into the hands of the national authorities.
This was a cause for much of the unrest that followed.

A few examples

of that frustration were the unsuccessful revolts of Bahrain between
1954-1956, of Qatar in 1963, and of Kuwait in 1959.

The struggle

against the British presence was intensified in Aden in the early
sixties.

Aden gained independence in 1967.

In Dhufar, a rebellion

began in June 1965 and continued until 1975, when it was defeated
militarily but not politically.
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The end results of the British presence and policies in the Gulf
have enhanced the Soviet Union's position.

Resentment of the British

colonial presence caused many, especially the educated elite, to turn
to political extremism.
gies.

To many, the alternative was radical ideolo

The leaders of the successful revolution of Aden are leftists,

the projected ideological basis of the Dhufari Rebellion is Marxist
Leninist, and Iraq has grown closer to the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union has been very active in using these frustrations
to serve its own interests.

According to the book KGB, there were

several operations by KGB (the Soviet secret intelligence agency):
One was aimed at sabotaging the oilfields and eventually
subverting the government of Saudi Arabia. The KGB there
had established and was attempting to sustain a terrorist
guerrilla organization calling itself the Front of Libera
tion of Saudi Arabia • • • • The KGB also had begun to build
cells of terrorists in the oil sheikdoms south of Kuwait,
Here again it sought to wrest
along the Persian Gulf.
control of another source of Middle East oil vital to
Eastern Europe and Japan. To attract future terrorists, the
KGB held out to youths of these sheikdoms the lure of
scholarships in the Soviet Union, where the most apt could
be observed, recruited, and trained. Sakharov, a prominent
KGB Middle East agent, noted that eighty young men from the
sheikdom of Qatar alone had already been ferried clandes
tinely to Russia through Cairo. (Barron, 1975, p. 58)
In spite of the British official departure from the Gulf at the
end of 1971, its presence is lingering.

Joseph Sisco, former Assis

tant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
stated, "When I say 'exodus' it is not a complete exodus, because bear
in mind that Great Britain has a number of its officers in the armed
forces in Oman, as well as in the federation forces of the United Arab
Emirates" (U.S. Interests, 1972, p. 87).
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When

one

examines

the

historical

background

of

the

Gulf

and

observes carefully the current events, one cannot help but attribute
some of the blame
However,

region.

to

Great

there are also other factors,

been mentioned briefly,
ity.
anc

Britain for fueling instability in the
some of which have

that contribute to this unrest and instabil

Again, several of these factors, consisting of border disputes
nationalistic

clashes,

might be considered side effects of the

colonial heritage of the British presence.

Border disputes

After the British "withdrawal" in 1971,
the

Gulf

states became one of the most threatening elements to the

stability of the area:

Iraq's claim to Kuwait;

Iraq over sovereignty in Shatt al-Arab;
Bahrain;

border disputes between

Iran's dispute with

Iran's outstanding claim to

Saudi Arabia's claim to the southern frontiers of Abu Dhabi

and the Buraymi Oasis, parts of which were claimed by Abu Dhabi and
Oman; and a common claim to the large sections of the Gulf median line
that delineated offshore rights.
These disputes do not seem as serious as then thought to be.

In

1971, Iran dropped its claim to Bahrain and instead occupied the three
islands of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs.

In the spring of 1973,

which

Kuwait,

has

never

dropped

its

claim

to

Iraq,

made menacing moves

toward the Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Buhayan, which command the
channels to the Iraqi naval base at Umm Qasr.
tension, however, the issue subsided.

Another

After several weeks of
t horny

i ssue,

t he
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territorial dispute between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi over their
frontiers and over Buraymi Oasis, was finally settled in July 1974,
when Saudi Arabia dropped its claim to Buraymi and gained a corridor
to the sea for its oil field south of Abu Dhabi.
Nationalistic clashes
Traditional rivalries between Arabs and Persians coupled with the
more recent policy differences are a continual source of friction.

A

clash of Iranian and Arab nationalism in the Gulf is exemplified by
the heated disagreement as to the name of the Gulf:
Arabian.

Persian or

This clash has religious overtones;

Iranians are Shila

Muslims and most of the Arabs are Sunni Muslims.

An Arab minority in

Iran and the Iranian loyalties of some groups on the Arab side of the
Gulf tend to complicate this issue and to continue frictions.

During

Shah's rule, the Arabs did not take kindly to Iran's benign attitude
toward Israel.

Moreover, while the Shah saw Iran as the dominant

power in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia never accepted the role of junior
partner in regional cooperation.
Political Threats
Conceptually,

political factors exist in the Gulf which are

potentially destabilizing.

They include:

the Arab-Iranian jousting

for political pre-eminence in the Gulf; the possible spread of more
serious radicalism in the whole region; the permeation of the new
technocratic middle-class in the

governmental

superstructure;

the

33
Arab-Israeli conflict; and the superpower intrusion.
Iran's role in the Gulf.

"The Arabs," stated an Iranian politi

cal scientist, "cannot but see that if the 1950's and 1960's were the
era of Nasser, the 1970's begin the era of the Shah" (Foreign Policy,
1975, p. 77).

The Arabs have resented such statements and similar

ones that reveal the Iranian imperial dreams in the area.
Because of its size and military and economic strength, the
Iranians feel justified to play a major role in the Gulf.

It is not

yet clear whether the Irani revolutionary government has relinquished
Iran's role of supremacy in the region.
Radicalism in the Gulf.

Potentially more serious are the radi-

calizing movements indigenous to the Gulf region.

The radical move

ments in Iraq, the ever present political threat of the Dhufari
Rebellion, and the Marxist-Leninist regime in South Yemen are serious
problems for the current rulers of the Gulf.

Also of importance are

the vocal though still unorganized workers in Bahrain and, probably of
greatest impact, the spill-overs from the Irani Revolution of 1978.
The New Middle-Class.

The influx of thousands of Gulf college

graduates, from Western Europe and the U.S., will in a few years have
a serious impact on the body-politic of the region.

This will probab

ly manifest itself in demands for political participation and a decen
trc:lized process for decision making on the national level.

This

"tidal wave" could eventually assert the direction and intensity of
change to the path of gradual political reform.
Arab-Israeli C onflict.

Over the past three decades, the Arab
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Gulf rulers have been drawn into the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This has

taken place at various junctures.
First, liberation of most of the Arabic countries from the grip
of the colonial era has drawn the Gulf region into the wider spectrum
of Arabic politics.

Second, the Gulf states were forced into the

climate of political fervor that had been awakened by the charismatic
leadership of President Nasser of Egypt during the 1950s and early
'60s.

Third, and most important, was the establishment of the Israeli

entity in 1948 and the birth of the Palestinian problem.

As a result

of this establishment, over a million and a half Palestinian refugees
were forced to flee to other Arabic countries.

A large influx of

these Palestinians were absorbed by the Gulf states due to the available financial opportunities.

The Palestinian presence has been a

constant reminder to the governments and peoples of the Gulf of the
need to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Fourth, the 1967 war

between Arabs and Israelis led to the emergence of the Palestinian
(fedayeen) movements which have brought more winds of revolutionary
ideas into the Gulf.

Fifth, the Arab oil embargo of October 1973 was

a direct reaction to the need for the resolution of this conflict.
What happens on the Arab-Israeli front will undoubtedly effect
the Arab Gulf states.

Therefore it comes as no surprise that the

Saudis believe that "the main cause of instability" in the region was
Israel, not the Soviet Union as claimed by Alexander Haig, the Secre
tary of State during his recent Middle East trip ( "Haig Ends," 1981,
P• A12).

35

Superpower Shadow.

Since the British government announced in

1968 its intention to leave the Gulf, the superpowers have been trying
to fill what is called the "vacuum" created by this departure.

This

has led the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to carry out more aggressive
policies and to assume a greater posture in the area.

This has

included a large direct military presence in the Indian Ocean and a
tremendous introduction of military hardware into the region through
their perspective allies.
It is needless to say that the withering away and the resolution
of these threats would substantially contribute to stability in the
Gulf.

There has been some evidence in the past few years, especially

since the Iranian revolution, that few of these threats have been
"tamed."

Iraq has been following a more "moderate" path; the Dhufari

Rebellion has been aborted militarily; rulers of different states have
made some timely concessions in giving a somewhat larger role to the
"new middle-class" in the building.of the countries' infrastructures.
Kuwait has recently reinstalled a parliament that had been dissolved
in 1976, Bahrain has promised to reinstall its parliament, and Saudi
Arabia has vowed to establish an advisory council ("Maglis el-Shura").
However, it is doubtful that the other main political threats, namely
the Arab-Israeli conflict and the superpower intrusion in the region,
will be resolved in the foreseeable future.

THE SOVIET INTRUSION
The increased international focus on the Gulf, the marked rise in
recent years in Soviet sea power and in Soviet presence in the Middle
East have stimulated considerable interest in, and speculation about,
Soviet objectives in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula states.

Since the

days of the Czar, the Soviet Union has had naval-inaritime aspirations
in the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular.
Geopolitical Interests
Beyond strategic and ideological considerations, the Soviet Union
has been perceived to have a growing interest in the Middle East oil,
most of which comes from the Gulf region (Berry, 1972, PP• 149-151).
First, the U.S.S.R. provides more than half of the East European oil
requirements,

which are

expected

to

rise

substantially.

Soviet

control, or influence over, these oil supplies -- whether directly
from the Middle East producers or indirectly through Soviet channels
-- would be a powerful lever to retain Moscow's sway over Eastern
Europe.

Second, probably even more important, is the heavy dependence

of Western Europe, Japan, and, to a lesser extent, the United States
on the Gulf oil.

Soviet hands on the oil spigots of the Gulf would

give them a unique instrument for exploiting the fissures in the
Western Alliance.

Third, the interruption of oil supplies to NATO

Europe, the Sixth Fleet and other U.S. military forces in the theater
would inevitably reduce NATO's defense capability and drastically
narrow the range of options open to the Alliance in a crisis or war
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situation.

Even

the

Seventh

Fleet operating

in

Southeast Asia

receives some 75 percent of its black oil from the Gulf (Joshua, 1974,
P• 62).
In short, the oil resources of the Gulf have added a major geopo
litical dimension to Soviet concern with the region.

However, the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) "now predicts that during the 1980's
Moscow will still meet its energy needs without having to import
petroleum" (Gwerzman, 1981, p. Al).

This is in contrast to the 1977

CIA assertion that Soviet domestic consumption was expected to outrun
its production by 1985.
Difficulties
The most important diplomatic difficulty facing the Soviets in
the Gulf is the fact that all the states on the Gulf--with the exception of Iraq--are very anti-communist.

"Neither we nor the Shah of

Iran nor the king of Saudi Arabia nor anyone else in this area, save
possibly the Iraqis, believe it is possible to coexist with Russia,"
asserted an Omani Official, "any question of the Gulf states coopera
ting with Russia is like a foolish lamb offering to gambol on the
hillside with a hungry lion" (Foreign Policy, 1975, p. 78).
Moscow has no diplomatic or colIDDercial relations of any kind with
Saudi Arabia and the four small states.
little trade activity in Kuwait.

It has an embassy and a

According to the International

Institute for Strategic Studies of London, "Bahrain and Qatar rejected
SoYiet

proposals to open diplomatic missions and an agreement in
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principle

by

the

Union

Ara b Emarates

of

Embassy was not implemented"

(UAE) to

(The International

accept

a

Soviet

Institute, 1973,

p.

26).
Iran's

relations with the Soviet Union,

tense

in the

post-war

period, was relaxed by the late Shah and reflected certain areas of
mutual economic interest.
More than 90 industrial and national-economic facilities
have been built or are now being built • • • • In turn, Iran
is supplying the Soviet Union with industrial products,
mineral raw materials and certain types of traditional goods
required by
economy.
("Foreign affairs," 1974, pp.
17-18).

u.s.s.R.

This

normalization

of

Iran's

relations

with

the

Soviet

Union

started in 1962 when "the Shah assured Moscow that he would allow no
American missiles to be based on his territory, as they then were on
Turkish territory" (Foreign Policy, 1975, p. 78).

This normalization,

however, did not diminish Iran's strong orientation toward and ties
with the Western world.
Among the G ulf states, the
mate relations with Iraq.
cooperation" that

was

u.s.s.R.

has developed the most inti

The fifteen-year treaty of "friendship and

signed

between

the

April 9, 1972, was allegedly concluded on

Soviet Union

and

Iraq

Iraq's initiative.

on

This

agreement was more comprehensive than the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of
the preceding year.

Moscow has been Iraq's chief military supplier.

Apart from the oil industry, Soviet economic and technical aid to Iraq
included the building of factories for food processing and the manu
facturing of textiles, glass and medicines.
Iraq is the Soviet's only military toehold in the Gulf.

Soviet
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war ships have used the facilities of the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr.
Iraq has denied strongly the Pentagon's allegations that the Iraqi
port of Umm Qasr is a Russian base and has said that the aim of these
statements is to justify the presence of American bases in the Indian
Ocean and the Gulf.

Next to Iraq, the People's ·Democratic Republic of

Yemen (PDRY) is the closest to the Soviet Union.

It is through PDRY

that the U.s.s.R. gave military support to the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Oman (PFLO).

(See Novik, 1979, for a closer look at the

Soviet relations with PDRY.)
For some years, the People's Republic of China has had a diplo
matic presence in Iraq and in two Arabian Peninsula countries outside
the Gulf:

the Yemen Arab Republic and PDRY.

China was effective in

providing economic assistance to the two Yemens.

In 1971, Iran and

Kuwait established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of
China.

Except for the support through South Yemen of the PFLO, there

was no evidence of significant Chinese political activity in the Gulf
region.
Presence in the Indian Ocean
Extensive literature has been written in recent years about the
u.s.-u.s.s.R. rivalry in the Indian Ocean.
central concern of the present study.

The Indian Ocean is not a

Since the Soviet policy toward

the Gulf cannot be wholly understood except in the larger perspective
of the Indian Ocean, we shall at least have to mention the primary
issue that seems to be disturbing the security planners in the
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Kremlin.
The Gulf is not a good naval body.

Its waters are too shallow,

clear and confined for strategic vessels, either submarine or surface.
Nevertheless, the Gulf, as an arm of the Indian Ocean, has been subtly
influenced by the strategic rivalry of the superpowers that is cur
rently threatening to develop in its open waters. In other words, the
key to ending the cold war in the Gulf is to end it in the Indian
Ocean.
In the age of missile submarines, the Arabian Sea which is the
northwest portion of the Indian Ocean, must appear to the Pentagon
watchers in Moscow even more menacing than does the eastern Mediter
ranean.

From the Arabian Sea, most of the industrial Soviet far west

(including Moscow and Central Asia, with its aerospace and missile
development and production) and western Siberia fall within its range
of Polaris submarines and Poseidon MIRV's.
In the mid-seventies, conflicting opinions about the strength of
the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean were published.

Many of the

military experts created a certain fear of the Soviet presence, remin
ding the Americans of the "new" Russian penetration.
Pravda ( Soviet's of ficial newspaper) tried to rebut these
American fears:
In an effort to retain their positions in South Asia,
imperialist circles in the West are building up their mili
tary presence in the Indian Ocean and are hastening to
create new strongholds here. The British-American agreement
on the construction of a U.S. military base on Diego Garcia
is a pertinent example. As always, lies concerning Soviet
"penetration " into this area and the construction of "Soviet
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bases" here are serving as a propaganda screen for such
actions. ("World politics," 1974, p. 16)
The U.S. News � World Report quoted from what it calls "top
authorities",

"As far as it knows, the Russians have no permanent,

shore-based naval facilities in the region" ("Can Russia," 1974, p.

42).

The fact remains that both superpowers ate ambiguous about their

military presence in the now very important Indian Ocean.
Aims
In the Gulf, the Soviet rulers have appeared to view the contin
ued preferencial military and oil-concessionary presence of Britain
and the United States as wholly undesirable.

Since the Soviet Union

does not state all its purposes explicitly, the assessment of Moscow's
real aims in the Gulf on the basis of propaganda and visible actions
must remain speculative.
It is widely believed (and particularly after the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan) that Moscow is in the Gulf to achieve a master plan
for the seizure of all the oil in the Gulf

that once the tap was

securely in its grasp, Moscow would be able, even in peace-time, to
turn it on or off at will, thus forcing the Western industrial states
to their knees as the energy crisis deepened.

Since such a develop

ment would almost certainly initiate a war with the United States and
Western Europe, it must be ruled out as most unlikely.

Others have

viewed the undeniable Soviet efforts to join in the scramble of Gulf
oil as evidence of a desire to secure sources of supply outside the

u.s.s.R.
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Those whom Moscow chose to aid -- leaders of PDRY,
Dhufar

Rebellion

--

were

described

in

the

Soviet

Iraq, and the

press

as

people

struggling against the American imperialists and their local lackeys.
It was a struggle in which the "socialist world" and the "progressive
forces of the third world" were natural allies.
for

Soviet

decisions

policy

emerge

in

the

from

a

long term,

Ideology is important

but practical foreign

policy

balancing of interests and priorities,

of

domestic and international factors, and of institutional pressures and
It is probably misleading to discuss whether

personal differences.

the Soviet policy in the Gulf is motivated by a grand strategy or by
opportunism.

If the former, the strategy is flexible enough to avoid

a timetable and to accept setbacks along the way,

hoping to reverse

them.

If the latter, opportunities can be created as well as stumbled

upon.

The key question is whether the success won on the periphery of

the

Gulf could be extended to the center.

of Soviet behavior.

it is relevant to observe the general pattern

For a long time,

their influence whenever it was
essentially
Ethiopia,

continued

tests

they are not conclusive.

were made in Iran and in Afghanistan:
In this junction,

In 1979 and 1980,

in

Soviets have sought to e>epand

safe to do so.

method.

For

Cuban soldiers were utilized.

greater capability for airlift.

In

example,
In

That pattern has
in

Angola

Ethiopia,

Afghanistan,

the

and

there was

in
a

Soviets moved

against what they thought to be a border security problem.
pattern of Soviet behavior is essentially what it has been:

But the
it has

been cautious, it takes advantages of opportunities, but it does not
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display a wave of aggressiveness.

In doing so, the Soviets have

always sought to avoid direct involvement in a conflict with the West.
There is no doubt about their concern about the danger of war.

THE NIXON DOCTR INE IN THE GULF

Interests

Richard Nixon (1980) dramatized the great importance of the Gulf
when he stated, "More than ever, the question of who controls what in
the Persian Gulf and the Middle East is the key to who controls what
in the world" (p. 74).
In
during
which

a

statement before

hearings,
"we

have

Joseph
very,

the House

Sisco,

very

Foreign

to

define

the

significant

United

Subcommittee

referred to the Gulf as an area in

interests" (New Perspectives, 1973, p. 6).
hearing

Affairs

States

political-economic-strategic
When asked in an earlier

interests

in

the

Gulf,

Sisco

replied:
First, I think it is an important area strategically in the
sense of it being a waterway, communications, freedom of
transit. Second, I think it is an important area in econo
mic terms, not only in the necessity of these oil resources
being available to our Western European allies, but a good
many of these oil resources being available to the United
States where our resource requirements projected over the
next decade or two can be expected to increase.
Third,
there are other economic interests that we have in terms of
the opportunities for markets, our own advice, investment,
and so on. ( U.S. Interests, 1972, p. 85)
By far the most important U.S. interest in the Gulf is oil.
the

U.S.

increases

thirst

for

oil

increases,

(see Appendix I).

its dependence on imported

As
oil

According to the Report of the Energy

Project� the Harvard Business School:
The key contradiction is this:
While the declared aim of
American policy is to reduce the use of imported oil, the
United States has in fact become more and more dependent
upon it.
Between 1973 and early 1979, U.S. oil imports
44
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almost doubled, and had begun to provide almost half of the
nation's oil. Unless the United States resolves the contra
diction, it will be even more dependent on imported oil in
the 1980's. (Stoyangh & Yergin, 1979, p. 2)
This thirst for imported oil was coupled with the decline of
domestic oil production to make the U.S. more dependent on the Middle
East oil, and particularly the Gulf oil.

This was evident from the

amount of oil imported by the U.S. from Saudi Arabia which rose
steadily from 168.5 million barrels in 1973 to 256 million in 1975
(Congressional Quarterly, 1979a, p. 5-A).
Moreover, it was reported by the National Academy of Science that
the U.S. did not have the amount of undiscovered oil and natural gas
that it thought it had ("Why Shah," 1975, p. 3).
By 1973, the Gulf had become a significant market for the U.S.
exports from the standpoint of growth rate and trade balance (see
Appendix J).
Gessel,

In a statement before a House Subcommittee, Marinus Van

Deputy

Assistant

Secretary

of Commerce for

International

Commerce, said:
Since 1970 our exports to this area have increased on the
35 percent annually, greater than for any
average about
major world geographic area except Eastern Europe. We also
continue to run a substantial trade surplus with these coun
tries, our exports traditionally being more than double our
imports (although this ratio is narrowing now with our
stepped up imports of Persian Gulf crude oil).
(New
Per
-- --spectives, 1973, p. 175)
To the U.S., the Gulf became an area where "it makes a difference

-- to use Nixon's term.

Therefore, the U.S. Secretary of

Defense, James R. Schlesinger, declared in an interview, "The Persian
Gulf is an area of very great strategic significance.

It is a matter
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o f utmost importance for the security of the West that the Gulf
remains secure" ("Can Russia," 1974, p. 43).
When the above factors are combined with the almost complete
Western European dependence on the Middle East and especially the Gulf
oil, one can appreciate the true significance of the Gulf to the U.S.
An Instrument of Control
U.S. oil companies are predominant in the region.

Western Europe

and Japan clearly have been vulnerable due to their heavy dependence
on Gulf oil.

By 1972 Japan and Western Europe imported most of their

oil needs from the Gulf while U.S. imported only five percent.

This

has provided the United States with an effective instrument of control
over them, or if one prefers, "a close leash."

This became evident as

the events of the "energy crisis" of 1973 unfolded.
The relationship over the last decade between the United States
and its erstwhile allies in the industrialized capitalist world has
been one of increasing tension and competition in the economic and
political spheres.

For one thing, Western Europe's emergence as a

major economic entity through the European Economic Community (EE C)
made it serious competition for the United States.

For another,

Japanese textiles, steel, automobiles, and electrical equipment carved
out larger and larger sections of the U. s. market.

There was much

talk about the "Japanese miracle" and soon-to-be "Japanese super
power.
Higher oil prices of 1973 did not fundamentally originate in
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decisions made by OPEC nations but in the changing conditions of
international competition.
October war.

It reflects the long-term drive of the United States to

raise world oil prices.
Institute

The "energy crisis" erupted before the

of

Technology

Oil economist M. A. Adelman of Massachusetts
stated

his

belief that

the

steep price

increases can be attributed to U.S. capitulation to OPEC during nego
tiations over the Tehran agreement.
Adelman (1973) observed, "Without active support from the U.S.,
OPEC might never have achieved much" (p. 86).

He termed a January

1971 meeting in Paris of oil-importing nations the "turning point" and
said that,
there is no doubt that the American representatives and the
oil companies assured the other government that if they
offered no resistance to higher oil prices they could at
least count on five years' secure supply at stable or only
slightly rising prices. (p. 88)
The role of the U.S. in the oil prices was confirmed by the U.S.
government itself at a forum at Yale University in late November 1974.
The government representative was Thomas

o.

Enders, Assistant Secre

tary of State for Economic and Business Affairs.

Enders was regarded

by insiders as "the chief architect of Secretary of State Kissinger's
energy policy."
ling" news.

According to The New York Times, Enders broke "start

The news, "startling against the background of repeated

declarations of high American officials that OPEC nations must reduce
their exorbitantly high prices -- is that the United States is now
founding its strategy on the $11 price."

Enders explained that such a

high price was necessary to protect "heavy American and other Western
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investment in the development of alternative energy sources, based on
the assumption of a continued 'real' oil price of $11 a barrel" (Silk,
1974, pp • 51 ; 59) •
In both the political and economic realm,

the energy crisis

strengthened and enhanced the U.S. position vis-a-vis Europe.

Politi

cally, it was not a sheer coincidence that "the changes in government
in Germany, and particularly in Britain and France, brought to power
leaders more favorably disposed toward cooperation with the United
States than their predecessors" (Szyliowicz & O'Neill, 1975, p. 193).
Within the economic realm the increased difference between the United
States and Europe is even more obvious.

Although some weaknesses in

her economic position have been revealed by this crisis, the United
States nevertheless emerged as comparitively stronger than her allies.
Her high degree of self-sufficiency in the field of energy
and most raw materials, her position as an exporter of many
scarce goods including foodstuffs, and the obvious streng
thening of the dollar in comparison with the almost unman
ageable balance-of-payments deficits in many European coun
tries have reconfirmed if not strengthened the position of
the United States as the strongest economic power in the
world. That position may well be enhanced by the likelihood
of Arab reserves being rechannelled into the Western economy
primarily through the American economy.
(Kaiser, 1975,
p. 21)
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the conclusion reached by
a noted Middle East observer, John Campbell, was that:
the United States had placed its reliance on what was known
as the 'two-pillar system' (the pillars being Saudi Arabia
and Iran) to maintain stability and security.
After the
shocks of 1973 that system responded to the interests of
those two nations and the United States. (Campbell, 1978,
p. 627)
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Policies
Despite obvious political, economic and strategic implications
emanating from interests in oil, the Gulf did not come into focus as a
specific area of the United States policy until 1968 when the British
Government announced its intentions of "phasing out" its presence from
"East of Suez" by 1971.

Prior to that time the U.S. had developed

close relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two largest states in
the area, and maintained good relations with Kuwait.

Under a leasing

agreement with the British, a small naval installation was stationed
at Bahrain.

For the maintenance of the price and flow of oil, how

ever, the U.S. depended to a great degree on the major oil companies;
and for the maintenance of political security in the Gulf, the U.S.
depended mainly on Great Britain.
Iran had long been a prime recipient of U.S. military assistance,
hardware, and training as a "forward defense" country on the perimeter
of the Soviet Union.

Between 1946 and 1967 nearly $1.5 billion worth

of military assistance had been given to Iran.
officers had received training in the U.S.

Some 2,000 Iranian

Washington helped set up

SAVAK -- the State Organization for Intelligence and Security -- and
also set up police and gendarme missions.

By the mid-60s one friendly

observer noted that the Shah "had established • • • a police state
even more efficient than his father's" (Hurewitz, 1969, p. 287).
It was in 1965 that a new phase in U.S. military aid to Iran
began.

The U. s. began to send highly sophisticated air and naval

weaponry at the rate of $94 million per year.

Iranian defense expen-
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ditures as a percentage of a growing GNP began to climb sharply, from
4.8% in 1963-64 to 8.5% in 1971.
squadrons

of

F-4

Phantom

The decision to sell Iran several

fighter-bombers

was

made

in

196 6

decision to send Phantoms to Israel was not taken until 1968).
1968,

the

Johnson

Administration

agreed

to

supply

Iran with

(the
In
$600

million in modern arms over the next five years, which Iranian sources
confirmed would be used to maintain "stability" in the Gulf (Dishon,
1973,

pp. 83-84).

A naval

base at Bandar Abbas on the Straits of

Hormuz was expanded with the Export-Import Bank
1971,

P•

l;

2).

A

new

Third Army

Corps,

p. 213).

(Szulc,

complete with paratroop

units, was announced for deployment in Shiraz,
city (Burrell & Cottrell, 1972,

assistance

Iran's major southern

This policy of relying on

Iran as the primary power in the Gulf was not without its problems, to
be sure.
brought

The potential for a clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia was
home in February 1968 when an

Iranian gunboat arrested the

Saudi and American members of an ARAMCO -- the Arabian American Oil
Company

-- crew

drilling

in

disputed

Gulf waters.

An unscheduled

secret visit to Tehran by Under-Secretary of State Rostow kept that
affair

under

companies

in

wraps.

Rostow

the Middle East

also
to

prevailed
raise

upon

production

the

American

sharply

in

oil
Iran

rather than the other Gulf states in order to provide the Shah with
the foreign exchange necessary for his massive arms purchases (Stork,
1975, pp. 140, 142).
When Nixon

and Kissinger

came to

their review of U.S. foreign policy,

l

power

in 1969 and

conducted

they found the guidelines and
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even the specifics for policy in the Gulf already laid out (New Per
spectives, 1973, p. 39).

At least as far as the Gulf was concerned,

the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 represented not innovation but continuity
with a new added intensity.
U.S. policy in the Gulf as it developed after 1968 attempted to
reconcile U.S. concern for the "security" of the area with the judg
ment that the U. s. public would not support a direct security role
there.

Nixon (1980) recalled, with some disappointment:

Unfortunately, this came [Britain's 1968 announcement] at a
time when outcries against the war in Vietnam raised serious
questions about whether the American public would support
another major American commitment in a distant trouble spot
such as the Persian Gulf. (p. 82)
The emphasis of "security" in

overall U.S.

Gulf policy was

reflected in a statement of "five principles" by Joseph Sisco (1972)
in a congressional hearing:
-- Noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations.
--Encouragement of regional cooperation for peace and progress.
--Supporting friendly countries in their efforts to provide
for their own security and development.
--The principles enunciated at the Moscow summit of avoiding
confrontations in such areas of the World.
--Encouraging the international exchange of goods, services,
and technology. (p. 242)
These "five principles" were part of the first and the most widely
quoted policy statement on the Gulf by the United States Government.
In his statement, Sisco (1972) noted:
We share with these two countries [Iran and Saudi Arabia] a
strong mutual interest in the stability and orderly progress
of the region, as do Western European states and Japan••••We
all share an interest in an orderly, expanding marketplace
insulated insofar as possible from ideologically motivated
disruptions. (pp. 242-243)
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Aside from these "ideologically motivated disruptions," the U.S.
saw the threats to "stability" of the area in terms of:

"regional

conflicts between the neighboring states," the "virus of the Arab
Israeli conflict," and the Soviet threat addressed indirectly in the
fourth "principle" (Sisco, 1972, p. 242).
was not stated clearly.

Initially the Soviet threat

However, one could share the conclusion

reached by David E. Long (1975) that:
the primary Soviet threat to American Interests in the Gulf
and Indian Ocean region was seen more in political than in
military terms, and included potential Soviet support for
local subversive groups. (p. 7 1)
Approximately one year after Sisco's 1972 statement, James Noyes,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East, Africa and South
Asian Affairs, stated U.S. security interests in the Gulf:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Containment of Soviet military power within its present
borders;
access to Persian Gulf oil; and
continued free movement of United States ships and
aircraft into and out of the area. (New Perspectives,
1973 , P• 39).

This main emphasis on the containment of Soviet "intrusion" in
the Gulf was reflected later by Kissinger.

Kissinger's (1979) con-

ception was that the Shah should "fill the vacuum left by British
withdrawal, now menaced by Soviet intrusion and radical momentum"
(p. 1264).

The arguments about Soviet presence in the Gulf-Indian

Ocean area was disputed by CIA Chief William Colby who told Congress
that the Soviets were just responding to U.S. initiatives (Manning,
1975, p. 2 1).
As a result of its failure in Vietnam, the U.S. was unable to
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replace the British in the Gulf "directly."

This disability led the

U.S. to employ more of an "indirect" replacement.

The above "five

principles" provided the conceptual framework for a policy of politi
cal support and indirect security assistance with a minimum U.S.
presence beyond the military training missions already in place in
Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The policy relied · heavily on cooperation

between Iran and Saudi Arabia and became known informally as the "two
pillar policy," or in a broader context, "regional cooperation."

It

also relied on close cooperation with the British, who were expected
to continue a major, though in time diminishing, internal security
role in Oman and the Gulf Sheikhdoms.

Sisco elaborated in a lengthy

but revealing statement:
From our point of view, we have had a very clear-cut
policy, and if there is one area we have looked at very
carefully in the last 4 years, it is this Persian Gulf area,
because we anticipated the British exodus and we asked our
selves: What is it that the United States can do, consist
ent with the Nixon doctrine, to make a major contribution
toward stability in the area without ourselves getting
directly involved, because this is an area obviously in
which we have very, very significant political-economic
strategic interests.
What we decided was that we would try to stimulate and be
helpful to the two key-countries in this area -- namely,
Iran and Saudi Arabia -- that, to the degree to which we
could stimulate cooperation between these two countries,
they could become the major element of stability as the
British were getting out, as there was created a federation
of the United Arab Emirates and as independence came to
Bahrain. (New Perspectives, 1973, pp. 5-6)
The close and intricate relationship between the United States,
Iran, and Saudi Arabia led U.S. policy-makers to see the main threat
to the Gulf "Security" coming from the Soviets and from the radical
political

movements working to overthrow the monarchies.

United

54

States policy was directed toward suppressing those movements, using
and strengthening the monarchical regimes to guard against the possibility of a Libyan-type coup.

This was evident in Sisco's (1972)

statement:
Most governments of the gulf are friendly to the United
States and welcome commercial and cultural contracts. Our
policy toward the area is designed to support these govern
ments in maintaining their independence and assuring peace,
progress, and regional cooperation. (p. 242)
During 1971-1973, the foundation of the Nixon Doctrine in the
Gulf was fully laid.

Military and security assistance was stepped up

to Saudi Arabia and particularly to Iran.
However, in contrast to the policy statements of the Department
of State, very sober policy recommendations came in 1972 by the House
Subcommittee on the Near East.

For their significant perceptions, the

most important of these recommendations are cited at length in the
following:
First, United States relations with the states of the
Persian Gulf should continue to be practical and low-key••••
Second, we should maintain good contacts with the leader
ship based not so much on large, permanent presence, as on
regular occasional visits by high level United States Offi
cials. • • •
Third, we ought to expand our economic and political
relations outside the oil industry. This will broaden the
scope of our relations to help these states prepare for the
day when their economies will need to be diversified because
they can no longer expand their oil output.
Finally, the success of a prudent, low-key policy and the
ability of the United States to adjust to rapid changes in
an unstable area will depend, in part, on an adequate consi
deration and assessment in the United States G overnment of
the area, its problems and our policies• • • •
At the same time, four specific policies should be
avoided.
First, we should avoid projecting a negative policy of
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telling leaders what they should and should not do or other
wise resort to persuasion for support of these states on
international issues of no immediate interests to these
states.
These states should proceed at their own pace
internationally.
Second, we should not seek to replace the British in the
Gulf or fill any so-called "vacuum."
A low profile is an
essential prerequisite to keeping the potentially unstable
Gulf area out of any sphere of great power • • • •
While the Soviet Union would like to,_and probably will,
increase its influence in this area, there is no evidence
that the Soviet Union is embarked on a grand scheme to
control the oil faucets of the Persian Gulf • • • •
Third, in an area of many and overlapping regional and
intracountry disputes, we should not become identified too
closely with any state, because then its causes might well
become our causes.
This is particularly true of Iran and
Saudi Arabia • • • •
However, the United States should not let its desire for
good relations with any state suggest a preference for the
domination of the Gulf by that state • • • •
We are currently seeking, but should not force, this type
of cooperation among states which harbor some deep-seated
animosities against each other.
Fourth, the United States should avoid, where possible,
becoming too closely identified with particular individual
leaders and instead depend on maintaining a close rapport
(The
with both leaders and technocrats in these states.
-United States, 1972, pp. 12-13)
In retrospect, these recommendations represented,

probably, the

wisest course that the United States policy in the Gulf could have
taken.

They embodied the earliest official criticisms voiced against

the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf.
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The Arms Sales

The U.S. arms sale push was begun in the early sixties, but any
favorable effect on the payments deficit was soon submerged under a
wave of Vietnam spending, which eventually combined with a deteriora
ting trade balance to produce an economic crisis of major proportions
in 1971.

As a result of these factors and structural weaknesses in

the U.S. economy, arms sales have assumed an important role in both
the economic and military facets of the Nixon Doctrine.
As was mentioned previously, after the British withdrawal from
"East of Suez," responsibility for "maintaining stability" in the Gulf
area passed
Arabia.

to

the two major oil producing states,

Iran and Saudi

To the U.S. this was a necessary step to counter a possible

radical or Soviet action.
This
coupled

need

with

for

the

strong

U.S.

regional

reluctance

--

powers
in

to

"maintain

accordance with

stability"
the

Nixon

Doctrine -- to station troops in the area produced an enormous upsurge
in arms

sales

to the

region.

This

massive

arms buildup in

Saudi

Arabia and particularly Iran was in part a logical extension of the
Nixon Doctrine and of the U.S. assistance effort in those countries,
which had been going on for over two decades.

As the Doctrine was

explained in 1970 by David Packard, the Deputy Secretary of Defense:
The best hope of reducing our overseas involvements and
expenditures lies in getting allied and friendly nations to
do even more in their own defense.
To realize that hope,
however, requires that we must continue, if requested, to
give or sell them the tools they need for this bigger load
we are urging them to assume. (Klare, 1974, p. 48)
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Thus, the American arms industry, with declining orders from the
Pentagon, could already expect some relief through orders from other
countries.

At the time, the Nixon Doctrine was welcomed with relief

by most politicians as the means of extricating American troops from
South-East Asia.

But it was really a gamble of extraordinary rash-

ness, for it assumed that allies who had this ·new freedom to buy arms
would use them wisely, in the Western interest.

And the stakes of the

gamble were soon to be abruptly raised.
In 1971 the United States foreign trade balance showed a deficit
for the first time since 1893.

The need for exports was now far more

urgent than ten years before, when the Defense Department had first
unleashed the Pentagon's salesmen.

The aerospace slump and unemploy

ment added to the crisis.
Nixon and Kissinger both tended to regard arms selling as an
extension of diplomacy,

in the nineteenth-century tradition.

The

humiliation of Vietnam, and America's weakened economy, had engendered
more skeptical and short-term diplomatic attitudes, treating arms as
counters in the world's game with which to bargain for settlement or
to placate client-states.
The recovery of the arms industry was thus already under way in
1972, which culminated in Nixon's re-election.

But the real take-off

began a year later with the oil price hike of 1973.

The quadrupling

of the oil price brought a surge of wealth to the states of the Gulf,
led by Iran and Saudi Arabia.

For any nation faced with sudden

wealth, arms provided the easiest and quickest way to spend money,
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bringing prestige and new authority to the rulers.

Hospitals, schools

and welfare provided huge problems of administration and social dis
ruption while arms companies brought their own infrastructure and
training, making links with high technology which rulers longed for.
Following the withdrawal of most of the British military pres
ence, the region that was then said to be a "power vacuum" was rapidly
becoming one of the world's most heavily armed areas.

Lee Hamilton,

Chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia,
asserted:
While we may be unsure of the implications and significance
of these sales, we are conscious that arms sales are playing
a predominant role in the Persian Gulf policy that our
Government has shaped in the last couple of years.
(The
Persian Gulf, 1974, p. 1)
The defence budgets of Iran and Saudi Arabia rose from about $1.5
billion in 1972 to about $13 billion in 1975.

Iran alone became among

the top fifteen nations in world defense expenditures.

If the quan-

tity of this build-up was impressive, so was its nature.

Iran was

likely to deploy the fastest generation of American fighters even
before these aircrafts became available to the American allies in
Europe.

By 1974, the percentage of the worldwide total of U.S foreign

military sales deliveries to the Gulf countries, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and Kuwait exceeded those to NATO countries.
In speaking about this huge U.S. arms sale to the Gulf, Hamilton
said, "The figures of this enormous business speak for themselves,"
then continued:
The U.S. MAAG Mission in Iran is one of the largest in the
world. Persian Gulf states account for perhaps as much as $6
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billion of the total U.S. arms sales overseas in fiscal year
1974 of the over $8 billion Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
has said we sold.
That worldwide figure compares with a
fiscal year 1973 figure of between $3 and $4 billion of which
Gulf, 1974,
over $2 billion went to Iran alone. (The
- Persian -P• 1)
Table 1. Foreign Military Sales Deliveries
(percentage of worldwide total)
1970

Fiscal year 1971 1972 1973

1974

NATO countries .

44

43

45

32

23

Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait

10

7

18

24

24

Source:

United States Arms, 1975, p. 5.

When we compare the arms deliveries of the U.S. to the Gulf and
those of the other suppliers, namely the United Kingdom, France and
the U.S.S.R.,

then we can appreciate the scope of the

involvement in this region.

American

Here we also find the figures astoni

shing.

Table 2.

Arms Deliveries to the Gulf
countries, 1970-75

. .

United Kingdom .
France.

u.s.s.R.

.

Total
United States
Source:

. .

.

.

.

.

1.83 billion
1. 67 billion
6 00.5 million

$

$

4.1

billion

7.94 billion

United States Anns, 1975, p. 6.

Therefore,

when Lt. General H. M. Fish, Jr.,

Director of the

Defense Security Assistance Agency, told a House subcommittee that
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U.S. Arms Sales abroad totalled $9-10 billion in 1975 and that 80
percent of these sales went to the Middle East, a congressman told
him, "You're building the biggest firecracker in history" ("Pentagon's
Arms," 1975, p. 12) •
Table 3.
==
Iran
647,497
1950-69
1970
113,284
1971
396,613
1972
528,022
1973
2,108,787
1974
3,917,121
1975
2,567,903
10,279,227
TOTAL
Source:

U.S. Foreign Military Sales and Orders to the
Persian [Arabian] Gulf Countries, 1950-75
(thousands of dollars)
Iraq

Kuwait

Oman

13,152

13,152

53
30,400
370,496
400,949

1,613
1,613

Saudi Arabia
161,468
14,854
95,845
342,295
83,984
2,539,408
1,373,862
4,611,686

Total
822,117
128,138
492,428
870,317
2,192,824
6,486,929
4,313,974
15,306,627

Berman, 1976, p. 100.

These weapons sales were justified by the United States as mainly
necessary to bring "stability" to the area and to deter all radical
movements.

Hamilton refuted this argument:

Several justifications for our arms policies were presented
to the subcommittee by the State Department and the Defense
Department during these hearings • • • but these explanations
do not dispel several doubts. The Soviet-backed threats to
Iran and Saudi Arabia supposedly emanating from So uth Yemen
and Iraq may be real, but they are small and potential. You
do not need a sledge hannner to crack a nut. Since 1965, our
sales of arms and services to Iran and Saudi Arabia are
roughly six times estimates of Soviet activity in the
Persian G ulf area. (New Perspectives, 1973, p. 8)
Obviously, the underlying purpose of these arms sales has been an
effort to sop up surplus petrodollars available in every state in the
Gulf.

This was evident in a statement made in 1975 by Alfred L.
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Atherton,
Asian

Assistant

Affairs.

He

Secretary

of

stated

"additional

an

State

for Near Eastern and
objective"

South

of the United

States policy in the Gulf:
There is now, however, an additional objective in light of
the vast increase in oil revenues, and that is to assist and
encourage the countries of the region to recycle their sur
plus revenues into the world economy in an orderly and non
disruptive manner. (The Persian G ulf, 1974, p. 85)
Did

the

United

This was answered
States A rms,
Gulf.

States have an arms sales policy in the Gulf?

by a report

of

a

special

study

mission

(United

1975) during May 1975 to examine U.S. arms sales to the

The report concluded:

Unfortunately, a U.S. arms policy has not developed as
quickly as the sales themselves. Our policy is nonpolicy •
• • • In Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, I encountered a
shadow of a U.
arms sales policy based on a dollars and
cents approach. (p. 8)

s.

Among

the

various

explanations

heard

"stability" in the Gulf is essential to U.

in

s.

Washington

was

that

interests, and that in

order to achieve it such countries as Iran and Saudi Arabia must be
militarily powerful beyond challenge.

Nobody opposes the first part

of this argument, but there are many doubts about its corollary.
other words,

what is

In

questioned is whether the concept of a strong

Iran or Saudi Arabia did not go beyond the realm of reason and thus
become a danger.

This was affirmed in the conclusion reached by the

special study mission (United States Arms,

1975),

"Military weaponry

sales which are designed to promote stability may actually have the
opposite effect and undermine security" (p. 13).
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It took only about three years to prove the validity of this
argument:
(Ramazani,

with
1979)

eruption of
of

the

Iran

in

1978.

Gulf concluded,

As

a

noted

observer

"However one evaluates the

di verse cause of the Iranian revolution, there is little doubt that
these

unrestrained

(p. 824).

arms

transactions

contributed

to

its

outbreak"

THE SHAH I S ROLE
Father and Son
Far from being a hereditary monarch, his Imperial Majesty the
late Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Shah-an-Shah [King of Kings], was the son
of Reza Kahn, a cavalry officer -- an illiterate until adulthood -
who provided the military support for a coup in 1921 against the
reigning Qajar dynasty.

Reza Kahn took the name Pahlavi -- the name

of the ancient Persian language -- as an act of public relations when
he crowned himself Shah.
significant.

His choice of the name Pahlavi was highly

It symbolized his desire both to associate himself with

the glories of Iran's past and to give a sense of legitimacy to the
dynasty.

Pahlavi was the language spoken by the Parthians who ruled

Persia after Alexander the Great and is considered to be the basis of
the present Persian language.

The need to justify the existence and

legitimacy of the Pahlavi dynasty had been a continuing theme.

It was

less so with Reza Shah and was more pronounced with his son.
One cannot allow the desire to found a durable dynasty obscure
achievements performed.

Reza Shah restored a sense of national digni

ty and laid the ground work for a modern state by establishing a civil
service and a proper army.

He also broke the power of the tribal

chieftains who in the past had made government authority a fiction in
many provinces.

Reza Shah held the same powers as Mustapha Kemal

Ataturk in Turkey and he used them to the same ends, yet with one
major difference.

He did not secularize Iran, perhaps because he
63

64

wished to retain the importance of the Shiia Moslem beliefs that had
given Iran its special Islamic character, or because he realized that
he risked provoking the opposition of the powerful mullahs, the relig
ious leaders.

As it was, many traditional Iranians considered him

contemptuous of religion since he made his belief known that the
clergy was a brake on modernization.

His son observed later, "If he

had not treated them [the clergy] somewhat roughly; it might have
taken three or four times as long as it did to carry out his programme
of modernising the country" (Pahlavi, 1974, P• 35).
Shiism has had a definite hierarchy of religious authorities that
have stood apart from the governmental claim of command.

Two particu

larly important concepts -- the right to revolt against unjust rulers,
and the existence of organized religious power centers outside state
authority -- were more strongly developed in Shiia Islam than they
were in the majoritarian Sunni sect.

Shiism is at the same time more

mystical and more devoted to charismatic leadership.

As early as the

680s A.D., Shiia mullahs were formenting revolutions in order to build
a new order of social justice.

They justified their uprisings by the

sayings of the Prophet Mohammed:
At the end of time there will by tyranical amirs, vicious
viziers, treacherous judges, and lying jurists.
Whoever
lives to that time should not serve them, not as inspector,
nor as collector, nor as treasurer, nor as policeman.
(Lewis, 1974, p. 207)
Reza Shah quickly became a dictator, using the threat of Soviet
subversion, the need for powerful rule and the sheer force of his
personality.

l

In the end, Reza Shah was destroyed by events larger

65
than himself.

His country and its oil fields had become of major

significance to Britain.
forcing his abdication.

In 1941 Allied troops moved into Iran,
His son, Mohammed, who was aged only twenty

one, was placed on the throne, as a virtual puppet of the Allies.
Mohammed Reza Shah was an altogether more complex character than
his father.

He began life as a commoner, borri a twin with his sister

Ashraf on October 26, 1919.
was almost 11 years old.

At the time of his father's coronation he

From that time on, as the Crown Prince, he

led a protected, rarefied existence.

He was singled out to learn the

rules of kingship from his gruff, intimidating father.

Mohammed Reza

Shah was a sickly child who narrowly escaped dying of typhoid.

He was

of slighter build than his father and seems to have developed a
complex about his size.
Reza Shah had a down-to-earth view of things; his son claimed to
have visions (Pahlavi, 1974, pp. 54-55).

Reza Shah saw himself as a

patriot; his son went beyond this and sought to give his rule a sense
of "divine mission."

He found evidence of this divine mission in his

amazingly lucky escapes from at least one dangerous air crash and five
known assassination attempts.
When you think I've been wounded by a good five bullets • • •
I've had so many air
You have to believe in miracles.
disasters, and yet I've always come out unscathed -- thanks
to a miracle willed by God and the prophets.
(Fallaci,
1977, P• 269)
Mohammed Reza Shah had the benefit of a proper education, with
selected sons of high officials in Tehran and later with the sons of
wealthy Europeans at Le Rosey in Switzerland.

By his own account it
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was an important experience; it opened his eyes to a wider world.

His

Swiss schooling created an admiration and fascination with Western
culture, technology and institutions.

But he maintained a strong,

almost chauvanistic, attachment to the values and traditions of Iran.
This ambivalence towards Western culture became more pronounced
with time and lay behind his assertion that a regenerated Iran would
soon take its place among the world's industrial powers in the Great
Civilization.

It also explains his desire to justify his authoritar-

ian system of government.

He made a revealing statement to Oriana

Fallaci ( 1977):
Believe me, when three quarters of a nation doesn't know how
to read or write, you can provide for reforms only by the
strictest authoritarianism -- otherwise you get nowhere. If
I hadn't been harsh, I wouldn't even have been able to carry
out agrarian reform and my whole reform programme would have
stalemated. (p. 273)
He regarded the monarch's role as being a combination of a father
figure, a revolutionary innovator, and a patriotic leader.

These

views are not alien to Iran's political culture and history.

Amin

Alimard and Cyrus

Elahi

(1976)

observed,

"As

one reads

Iranian

history, it becomes clear that most often the whole society was ruled
as if it were the personal possession of the King" (p. 217).
The fundamental nature of monarch has varied little since Cyrus
the Great proclaimed himself King of Persian in 546 B.C.

Continuity

has been maintained not so much by heredity as by those who have had
the strength and the will to gain power.

Success conferred its own

legitimacy and was the best guarantee of staying in power.

The insti

tution survived because it was the most effective means of wielding
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For the most part, monarchs were rarely enlightened and

authority.

were generally despotic:
A significant part of that heritage has been a relatively
centralized, authoritarian monarchy that used agricultural
surpluses to maintain its army and bureaucracy, leaving the
majority of the people powerless, illiterate and poor.
(Alimard et al., 1976, p. 218)
To this extent,

Mohammed Reza Shah was an extension of

Iran's

political culture and history.

A Dual-Objective

The

Shah's

overriding

objectives

were

fulfill his dreams of grandeur and empire.

twofold.

First was to

Second was to fulfill the

role of the policeman in the Gulf, a role that was self-assumed and
assigned to
Therefore,

him in

the spirit of

the Nixon Doctrine,

by the U.S.

to understand the Shah's policies is to understand this

oscillation between the fulfillment of his dream of grandeur and the
fulfillment of his assigned and self-assumed role.
The Shah developed four secondary objectives.
was the development of offshore oil fields.

The first of these

The second was to secure

and protect shipments of oil from possible disruption by the revolutionary segments in the Gulf.

The third was to maintain the status

quo in the Gulf by suppressing revolutionary movements of the Gulf.
The fourth concerned the stability of the Pahlavi regime.
not

insulated,

violence which
1962.

as the Shah
cost

well

knew,

Immam Mohammad

from

al-Badr

the

kind

of

Iran was
political

his throne in Yemen

in
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It has more than

Iran is the world's third largest oil producer.

30 million people, and a relatively large quantity of arable land.
Its

mineral

resources,

principally

copper,

may

be

potentially

as

valuable as its oil.
To

the Shah,

purpose -clear:
nations

the

economic

grandeur

and

of

military

Iran.

development

He made

were

for

one

his overall objectives

to make Iran by the end of this century one of the the richest
in

comparable

the world;
to that

of

to

achieve a

France

and

"European" standard of

Britain;

and

to

living,

achieve military

power so great that "they will take account of us" as the paramount
power in the region of the Gulf and as one of two or three

great

powers in the Indian Ocean, being no longer a "client" but a partner
of the United States.
It would

serve little purpose

to make an inventory of

Iran's

resources, wealth, and projects beyond perhaps noting the following
key factors:

by 1976, Iran earned about $20 billion in oil revenues

and by 1975 its foreign
billion.

exchange

reserves

already amounted

to $7. 5

As early as 1972, and before the high rise of the price of

oil in 1973,

Iran's state secretary for finance, Hassan Ali Mehran,

estimated the country's earnings from crude exports
covered by the five year

for the period

(1973-1977) plan would amount to $108,000

(Schultz, 1972, p. 25).
The United States

decided to rely on Iran to preserve Western

interests in the Gulf.

Iran was chosen to play this role because it

offered several distinctive features which other regimes lacked.

As
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formulated by Sisco (1972),
Iran, by virtue of its population, its economic and military
strength, and its geographic position along the northern
shore of the Persian Gulf, is destined to play a major role
in providing for stability in the gulf and the continued
flow of oil to consumer countries. (p. 244)
In an interview with Newsweek, the Shah asserted his assigned and
self-assumed role in the Gulf:
Not only do we have national and regional responsibilities
but also a world role as guardian and protector of 60 per
cent of the world's oil reserves • • • The Nixon doctrine says
the U.S. will help those who help themselves. That's what
we're doing.
European security is sheer mockery without stability and
security in the Persian Gulf. Western Europe, the U.S. and
Japan see the Gulf as an integral part of their security,
yet they are not in a position to ensure that security.
That's why we're doing it for them. (De Borchgrave, 1973,
p. 43)
American policy makers were always careful in public to stress
the role of Saudi Arabia as well as Iran in maintaining regional
"stability," but in fact the Saudi armed forces were in no way pre
pared to undertake an expansionist role similar to Iran's.

In 1972,

the London Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that "Saudi
Arabia's armed forces are not well placed to assert the country's
authority outside it's borders" (The Institute for Strategic, 1972, p.
40).

Thus American military assistance to the Saudi regime throughout

this period was designed to beef up its defenses and its internal
security capabilities.

(See New Perspectives, 1973, p. 44 for the

list of U.S.-Saudi military agreements.)
This

"foggy"

dichotomy

between

the

Irani

"roles" was evident in Nixon's (1980) latest work:

and Saudi Arabian
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Rather than replace the British presence with a direct
American presence, therefore, the United States chose to
rely on local powers, primarily Iran and Saudi Arabia, to
provide security for the Gulf, while we assisted by making
arms and other supplies available. • • • The Shah provided
the muscle that protected the rich but vulnerable Saudis•
• • • When the British left in 1971 only Iran had the trained
manpower, the resources, and the will to take over Britain's
stabilizing role. (pp. 82-84)
Arms, Money, Influence
In order to fulfill his dreams of grandeur and his "assigned"
role, the Shah embarked on building an enormous arsenal.

He also

spread his influence internationally by using his vast oil revenues.
According to The Guardian,
France, for example, obtained $1,000 millions deal •••• Tehran
has given loans amounting to $3,000 million to Italy; $1,200
millions to Britain, $1,000 millions to Egypt to help re
build the Suez Canal, and several hundreds of millions of
dollars to India and Pakistan. Iran also has given $1,000
millions to the World Bank. (Quatrepoint, 1974, p. 13)
Smaller amounts were pledged to

Sudan,

Tunisia,

Senegal, Jordan,

Syria, and Morocco.
The Shah knew that military power goes hand in hand with politi
cal power.

He

doubled and tripled the strength of his armed forces.

Undeniably, Iran became one of the world's major military powers.
The Iranian navy became the strongest naval power in the Gulf and
it wished to extended its influence to the Indian Ocean as well.
According to a statement by the Shah, Chah Bahar was to be expanded
into an army, navy and air base larger than that of any other power on
the Indian Ocean (Meister, 1973, P• 16).
The so-called "Iran's new window on the Gulf and the Indian
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Ocean," Bandar Abbas -- situated at the narrowest point of the Straits
of Hormuz -- became the base for Iran's military Hovercraft (Hover
craft is a military vehicle that scuds over water on its cushion of
air and is faster than any conventional ship).

"He [Shah] has ordered

more of them to keep watch over what goes in and out the Gulf and to
make Iran the world's leading military Hovercraft power" (Schmidt,
1975, p. S).
Sisco was certainly accurate when he said in June 1973 that "the
arms assistance arrangement being discussed with Iran and Saudi Arabia
are not knee-jerk reactions of the last few to a so-called energy
crisis, as some contend" (New Perspectives, 1973, p. 3).

Neverthe-

less, it is also true that American arms policy toward Iran escalated
sharply into a new phase in 1972-73.

President Nixon stopped off in

Tehran in May 1972, making a substantial detour from his route from
Kiev to Warsaw, and promised the Shah to make available to Iran the
most sophisticated weapons already in the U.S. inventory or planned
for production.

Soon

after the Nixon visit, Pentagon salesmen-

generals arranged to brief their Iranian counterparts and the Shah
himself on the virtue of such modern armaments as the F-14 and F-15
fighter-bombers.

(See U.S. Military, 1976 for more data on U.S. arms

sales to Iran.)
As discussed earlier, the U.S. was actively involved in the Gulf
arms build-up.

The type and sophistication of the armaments held by

the leading Gulf powers reflected deliberate effort to make Iran the
strongest military power in the area.

In fact, it was said that one
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of the last major arms deals with Iran included "most everything short
of atomic weapons," and in 1974, it was reported that Washington was
even selling laser-guided bombs to Tehran (Weinraub, 1973, p. 3).
According to the previously mentioned report (United States Arms,
1975) submitted to the House Committee on International Relations:
In 1975, Iran spent almost 28 percent of its total budget on
defense while Saudi Arabia devoted 10 percent of its budget
to defense. Using the most recent figures available for
Iraq, in 1974 that country spent around 8 percent of its
budget on defense.
Defense spending in Saudi Arabia in
creased by 450 percent between 1972 and 1975. Defense spen
ding in Iran has increased during the same period by an even
larger 1,100 percent. (pp. 13-14)
Under the Nixon administration the U.S. became committed, or
rather entangled, in a way it had not been before.

By permitting the

Iranian purchase of sophisticated equipment in unprecedented quanti
ties, the U. s. committed itself to make this hardware operational.
This meant an exposed profile in the form of extensive military and
civilian technical and advisory personnel in Iran to compensate for
the serious shortage of Iranian skilled manpower.

By 1976 it was

reckoned that the majority of the 24,000 Americans in
defense and defense-related.

Iran were

Before the revolution, this number had

been expected to reach between 50,000 and 60,000 by 1980, largely as a
result of the purchase of arms from the U.S.
p. viii).

(U.S. Military, 1976,

Such being Iranian dependence on expatriate personnel, it

was asserted (U.S. Military, 1976, p. 50) that she would be unable to
fight on a day-to-day basis without American support through the late
1980's.
The credibility of the Iranian military under the Shah was there-
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fore only achieved at the expense of Iranian independence.

Moreover,

in the view of American defense experts, this dependence was likely to
grow if the equipment became more sophisticated.

It was noted (U.S.

Military, 1976) that "in relation to the F-14, Iran is like a Texan
auto dealer dependent on Detroit" (p. 51).
Another important element was that, inevitably,

such massive

military build-up only frightened most of the Shah's Arab neighbors,
whose suspicions of renewed Persian imperialism evidently run just as
deep as Persia's fears of their behavior.
coolness between them and the Shah.
arms race all round the Gulf.

The result was marked

There was a powerful boost to the
Herman Eilts (1980),

former U. s.

Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1965-70 and Ambassador to Egypt,
1973-79, observed, "While there was no Arab love for the Shah, he was
viewed throughout the Gulf -- often to his annoyance -- as the bastion
of the American power position in the Southwest Asian area" (p. 89).
The Arab states of the Gulf rejected the Shah's plans for calleetive security in the Gulf.

They seemed to recognize a further and

genuine conflict of interest in the long run between the Shah's ambi
tion to make Iran a "great power" and their own wish to stengthen Arab
influence in the world.
Different Fronts
In taking up his "policeman" role after the British withdrawal
from the Gulf, the Shah had to make some fast moves to assume his
trump card, his claim to Bahrain.

On the eve of the British departure
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(November 30, 1971), Iran landed troops on and seized the islands of
Abu Musa and the two Tumbs, three Arab islands near the Strait of
Hormuz.
The British government, which then concluded the foreign
relations of the Trucial States, believed that the island of
Abu Musa rightfully belonged to the Sheik of Sharjah, while
the two Tumb Islands belonged to the- Sheik of Ras-al
Khaimah. (Burrell & Cottrell, 1972, p. 16)
The scenario of events leading to the Iranian takeover of these
demonstrated Iranian determination to dominate the region.

An Iranian

takeover of some sort was virtually inevitable, ("Three Islands,"
1971, p. 30) but the manner in which it was accomplished, not without
British connivance and American satisfaction, was calculated to high
light the inability and unwillingness of the Arab Gulf states to
challenge Iran ("Iran's Expanding," 1972, p. 6).

When asked (Time,

Nov. 4, 1974) about the Arab rivalry in the Gulf, the Shah replied,
"That is very funny, because without Iran to defend them they would be
dead.

Our first choice is to cooperate with all Arab countries on an

equal basis.

Our second choice is to go it alone if necessary"

(Prager, 1974, p. 34).
To placate the Arabs, Iran dropped its ancient territorial claim
to Bahrain.
It has been suspected that when the Shah pressed his claim
to Bahrain, he did so with the sole purpose of relinquishing
them with apparent magnanimity, as he did in May 1970, to
obtain his real objectives, the three islands in the Strait.
(Congressional Quarterly, 1972, pp. 50-51)
In November 1970, a year before the takeover, the newly enlarged
Iranian forces staged a major military exercise aimed at Beni Farur,
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an Iranian island in close proximity to those targeted for takeover.
As the day of British withdrawal neared, Iran rejected a face-saving
approach of leasing full military rights on the islands while allowing
Something close to that was

the sheikdoms to retain title to them.

arranged with Abu Musa which was partitioned into Iranian and Arab
zones, probably as means of substituting Iranian financial aid to
Sharjah for

British rent payments on its lease there.

islands were occupied by force.

The Tumb

Abu Musa is now the site of a new

Iranian airbase, and all the islands have been heavily fortified by
Iran.

It is from these three islands that the Shah planned to extend

his control over the very crucial Strait of Hormuz.
The Shah's

huge

military build-up

was

explained

by

Iranian

Officials in terms of threats that they saw from "conflicting national
interests and Communist subversion" from an area where security responsibilities are not well defined.

They believed that the major

danger is neighboring Iraq, an Arab socialist country that is equipped
with the most modern and sophisticated Soviet weapons and which sup
ports revolutionary movements in the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East
areas.

The Shah referred to the Baathist regime in Iraq as "a group

of crazy, blood-thirsty savages" (Sixty Minutes, Feb. 24, 1974).
The dispute over Shatt el-Arab between Iran and Iraq ended in
1975 -- Iran also stopped arming the Kurdish rebels in Iraq which led
to the end of the Iraqi civil war.
The

Iraqi-Irani agreement to

end

their

perhaps to open a new chapter in Gulf affairs.

dispute

was

thought

It could also serve,
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as The Christian Science Monitor noted, "to reduce Soviet influence in
an area of key strategic importance to the United States" ("Persian
Gulf Waits," 1975, p. 1).

This agreement was also interpreted as the

Shah's bid to gain some toleration for his dominant role in the Gulf
where he occupied the three Arab islands in 1971
Waits," 1975, p. 1).

("Persian Gulf

Another element was the ·shah's belief that this

agreement might modify Iraq's old status as a staunch ally of the
Soviet Union, wedded to the objective of overthrowing the traditional
monarchies of the Gulf region.
The Shah's more intractable problem proved to be his role in the
war in Oman against the forces of the Dhufari Rebellion.

(This will

be dealt with in a separate chapter.)
To the south, Iran has Pakistan as its neighbor.

The two coun

tries were allies, along with Turkey and Britain, all of which formed
the Central Treaty Organization

(CENTO).

This organization was

created by the Baghdad Pact of 1955 as part of the United States
containment policy against possible Soviet expansion into the Middle
East and the subcontinent.

Iraq defected from the pact in 1958, after

the monarchy of King Faisal II was overthrown.

Iran watched with

alarm as Pakistan was defeated in 1971, which led to the loss of East
Pakistan.
aid.

Neither Britain nor the United States came to Pakistan's

Iran gave some token support but did not fight.
Iran's military planners feared that any further breakdown of

Pakistan, through separatist movements in the North-West Frontier
region bordering Afghanistan or in the Baluchistan region on Iran's
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border, could bring India's army closer to Iran's borders.
fears led them to draw closer to India.

These

The Shah visited Delhi,

entertained the Indian Prime Minister Indira G andhi in Tehran, and
made economic transactions favorable to India, in hopes of weakening
India's

pro-Soviet

orientation

and keeping

it

from granting

the

Russians naval facilities in the Andaman Islands or elsewhere.
Confident of his control over the Gulf, the Shah indicated his
intention of extending Iran's presence to the Indian Ocean in order to
counter the growing Soviet naval strength there.
twofold.
lanes.

Iran's concern was

It viewed the Indian Ocean as an extension of the Gulf oil
It also feared that India might incite Pakistan's Baluchi

tribesmen, and then Iran's own, to revolt.

This would have the addi-

tional effect of weakening Pakistan as a buffer state.

For these

purposes, the Shah engaged American contractors to construct a $600
million military installation at

Chah

Bahar,

which would be the

largest base of its kind on the Indian Ocean.
The Shah also moved to other fronts.
1975.

He visited Egypt in January

After that visit, the Shah supported the Egyptian view of the

Middle East conflict and joined President Anwar el Sadat of Egypt in
calling for the Israeli pullout from the lands occupied in the 1967
war.

It is important to note that the Shah provided 50 percent of the

Israeli oil needs, worked closely with the Israeli intelligence, and
trained Israeli pilots on the American Phantom aircrafts.
The New York Times reported that:
Western diplomats in assessing the visit, said that the Shah
had made his support of the Arab cause more explicit than in
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the past on such key points as the Palestinian issue while
in return gaining an Egyptian endorsement of his oil-price
policy and of his ambition to make Iran a major power in the
region. (Tanner, 1975, p. 1)
The importance of the Egyptian endorsement was even more apparent
when viewed from the then Egyptian prestige in the Arab world.
Iran also moved to help bolster the Egyptian economy as a politi
cal reward for President Sadat's shift from the radical path of President Nasser.

Multimillion dollar loans and credits were given to

Egypt for various projects, including reconstruction of Port Said,
construction of the oil pipeline between the Red Sea and the Mediter
ranean, and other industrial and agricultural projects.
Iran's special interest in Port Said has been emphasized in
recent statements by Iranian and Egyptian officials.
An
Iranian foothold in the Mediterranean, observers believe,
would advance the Shah's plans to give his country major
influence not only in the Indian Ocean but also in the Medi
terranean region. (Tanner, 1975, p. 4)
Thus the Shah became as Newsweek said, "the biggest fish in a
small--but vitally important--pond" (De Borchgrave, 1973, p. 44).
Roots of Deterioration
The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 is a classic example of a
political revolution caused by society's superstructure, especially
the state, failing to reflect, represent, and keep up with changes in
a society's infrastructure.

The roots of the Shah's regime deteriora

tion reach back not to 1963, when Ayatollah Khomeini first raised his
voice, nor to 1953, when the CIA deposed Premier Mohammed Mossadeq,
but to 1949 when the Shah began the long process of creating an auto-
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cratic state that would stifle all opposition, and would attempt to
remold society in his own image -- or rather, in the image of his
dictatorial father.

By early 1949 the Shah, according to the U. s.

State Department, was seeking an opportunity to free himself of con
stitutional restraints and to establish himself the undisputed ruler
of Iran (Foreign Relations, 1978, p. 476).
The opportunity presented itself in February 1949 when a lone
assailant tried to shoot the Shah.

Al though no evidence was ever

produced to link the would-be assassin to any political organization,
the Shah promptly declared martial law, banned all newspapers critical
of

his

family,

and detained many of the opposition politicians,

including Mossadeq.

He convened a Constituent Assembly which unani

mously voted him the right to dissolve Parliament whenever he wished,
and created a Senate, half of whose members would be appointed by the
monarch.
Inevitably, the measures of 1949 created a public backlash.

In

the following months, a circle of prominent liberal politicians headed
by Mossadeq, a group of religious leaders representing predominantly
the bazaar middle class, and social democratic parties articulating
mainly the interests of the salaried middle class, all allied to form
the National Front.
end to martj_al law,

They demanded honest elections, free press, an
and,

British-owned oil industry.

most important,

nationalization of the

By 1950 the National Front was holding

mass rallies and was drawing large crowds.
Frightened by the mass demonstrations and further shaken by a
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massive general strike in the oil industry, the Shah in May 1951
appointed Mossadeq to be Prime Minister, a "safety-valve" for public
discontent.

Mossadeq,

"safety-valve."

however, was not willing to act as a mere

Having nationalized the oil company, he turned his

attention

to the

politics.

In July 1952, he demanded civilian control over the armed

forces.

and accused the

court of

interfering

in

When the Shah refused to comply, Mossadeq appealed directly

to the public.
streets.

Shah

The public responded to the appeal and poured into the

After three days of bloodshed, the Shah was forced to relin

quish control over the Army.
Mossadeq's victories, however, were deceptive.

For as soon as he

forced the Shah out of politics and threw the British out of Iran, an
ideological split occured between the secular and the religious wings
Encouraged by this split and financed and

of the National Front.

organized by the CIA, the army officers expelled Mossadeq and returned
the Shah to his throne.

Returning home triumphant, the Shah proceeded

to create the dictatorship he had always planned.

With the help of

the U.S. and Israel, he established a new secret police, SAVAK.
Armed with the military and the secret police, the Shah was able
to dismantle the opposition.

From 1953 until 1963 the repressive

state machinery focused predominantly on the radical intelligencia and
the urban working class.

After 1963, however, it broadened its

activities to include the clergy and the bazaar guilds.

Ayatollah

Khomeini, one of the six leading Shiia authorities raised a banner of
revolt by denouncing the Shah for selling the country to Western

l
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imperialism and for granting legal immunity to American military
advisors.

As the bazaars throughout the country closed in support of

Khomeini, the armed forces struck at peaceful demonstrations, killing
thousands in Tehran alone.
On July 5, 1963, a mass revolt broke out all over the
country. The Army was hastily called in to restore imperial
law and order, and the ensuing military repression was so
ruthless that thousands (it is believed up to 15,000 people)
were killed in the three-day battle. (Nobari, 1978, p. 64)
By 1974, Iran had become a police state.

According to moderate

estimates from Amnesty International, Iran had some twenty thousand
prisoners, and the use of torture was widespread.

In March of 1975,

the Shah announced a new political movement which formally quashed
even local opposition to the ruling Novin Party, and brought Iran more
toward an official one-party state.

The Shah's secret police, SAVAK,

was estimated at seventy thousand strong.
an "atmosphere of terror and fear."

Visitors to Iran spoke of

This atmosphere caused a "brain

drain" as many technicians and intellectuals chose to leave Iran.
The economic situation became gloomy.

Two thirds of all families

in Iran's capital of Tehran earned under $200 a year.
percent of all citizens lived at subsistence level.

Sixty-five

Over 70 percent

of Iranians were illiterate, and malnutrition was widespread.
In May 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini revealed in an interview how he
perceived the reasons for the upheavals that brought the downfall of
the Shah:
His [the Shah's] is a dictatorial regime:
individual
liberties have been swept aside; the press, political
parties and authentic elections have been suppressed.
Deputies are imposed by the Shah in violation of the consti-
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tution, religious and political meetings forbidden; cultural
freedom and the independence of the courts do not exist
anymore. The Shah has appropriated the three powers. He
has established a single party, and worse still, he made it
obligatory to join the party or suffer the consequences.
Our agriculture has been destroyed, whereas 23 years ago
its output exceeds our requirements because we were not
exporters.
According to the statistics supplied by the
Shah's own premier two years ago, Iran imports 93 percent of
its food requirements. That is what the Shah's so-called
agrarian reform has achieved. Our universities are shut for
most of the time, our students are beaten up and imprisoned
several times every year.
The Shah has destroyed our economy and squandered revenue
from oil--the wealth of the future--on gadgety weapons which
he acquires at overblown prices. It is an attack on the
country's independence.
I am against the Shah precisely because his policies,
kowtowing to foreign powers, compromise my people's develop
ment. ("Back to the Koran," 1978, P• 13)
Most of all, the Shah suffered from the lack of legitimacy among
the Iranian people.

As the events of 1978-79 unraveled, loyalty for

the Shah was almost completely absent.
(1979), a

According to Richard Cottam

keen observer of Iran and a former political officer at the

American embassy in Tehran in 1956-58, the Shah was regarded by his
people:
as a traitor, a creation of American and British imperial
ism.
In their view, the Shah's regime reflected American
interests as faithfully as Vidkun Quisling's puppet govern
ment in Norway reflected the interests of Nazi Germany in
World War II. (pp. 3-4)
Due to the Shah's vital importance to the U.S. as a "regional
stabilizer" and to his close "friendship" with Nixon and Kissinger,
Washington broke off all contact with the opposition in Iran and
turned a blind eye to his self-defeating internal policies.
As late as August [ 1978] U.S. intelligence authorities had
not understood the magnitude of the opposition to the Shah-
over-reliance on Iranian security sources for intelligence
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having deprived them of precisely the kind of objective
analysis that was crucial in a time of change. Unwilling to
risk the Shah's personal displeasure or short-term bilateral
goals, the U.S. (especially under Presidents Nixon and Ford
and Secretary Kissinger) had signally failed to exercise an
influence commensurate with her long and growing interest in
Iran.
Oblivious to the mounting evidence of mismanagement and
corruption, successive U. s. governments had failed to
impress upon the Shah the need for refor_m and decentraliza
Ironically, her entanglement had made
tion of authority.
the u. s. dependent:
unwilling to use her influence, she
became a captive of indigenous and local circumstance.
(The International Institute, 1979, p. 54)
Hermann Eilts (1980) asserted that "since the Shah was a valuable
security asset in the Gulf, Washington preferred to ignore or to down
play. the domestic shortcomings of his misrule and oppression" (p. 94).
A high-ranking State Department official complained that from the
1960s when the U.S. had as many as 17 embassy staffers in Iran doing
political reporting, by 1977 there were only two.

"You don't report

on an ally once he's become The Chosen Instrument.

It's bad manners, "

he said (Sale, 1980, p. 87).
In addition to "The Chosen Instrument" factor, another factor
emerged as the other reason why Nixon and Kissinger chose to turn a
blind eye to the Shah's "misrule and oppression."

This was the

"friendship" that binded the three over the years.

The Shah wrote

from his exile:
I was touched and grateful that President Nixon and Secre
tary of State Kissinger visited me. Both are old and trea
sured friends, and their visits showed how much they still
cared, not only for me but more importantly for the problems
I had long
we had fought together for so long to solve.
discussions with both men and found that our views on geo
politics still coincided, as they had during our common
years in power when relations between the U.S. and Iran were
so close. (Pahlavi, 1980, p. 16)

OMAN:

THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN ACTION

Oman enjoys the crucial strategic postion in the whole of the
Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula which governs the most important inter
national waterway linked by direct relations with oil.

Oman is a rich

land holding beneath it vast oil and huge_ quantities of mineral
wealth.

These important features activated European involvement to

maintain extensive control in Oman.
Dhufar, the northernmost province of Oman, where an insurgency
began in June 1965, has an area of about 25,000 square miles and a
population of 120,000.
mates).

Oman has a population of 750,000 (1972 esti-

The social and productive life in Dhufar is distinguished by

certain characteristics that set it apart from any other area in the
Gulf.

The people of Dhufar live mainly in small villages and along

the coast, often cut off from one another by high ridges of hills.
Most of its citizens, until recently, lived in deep valleys in huts
built of tree branches.

Tribal rivalries are reinforced by prejudice

The country of which Dhufar is a part was formerly

and ignorance.

known as Muscat and Oman, the name being shortened to Oman by Sultan
Qabus after his ascension in 1970.

Traditionally, Muscat included the

section so named and the coastal areas, while Oman indicated the
inland highlands.
A History
In the eighteenth century Oman was a major sea power in the
Indian Ocean.

In 1798 Britain signed a treaty of protection with the
84
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Sultan,

in direct response to Napoleon's occupation of Egypt which

threatened Britain's sea-routes to India.

From that time Britain

exerted substantial control over Oman's affairs.
commanded

the

sultan's forces

and British

British soldiers

civilians

undertook

the

usually unrewarding task of advising his administration.
Towards the

end

of

the

nineteenth

century,

Dhufar

became

an

established province of the Sultanate of Oman and was ruled by members
of the Al Bu Said dynasty from Muscat.

In 1932 Sultan Said bin Taimur

came to the throne and had to face Eurpean involvement on a scale
previously unknown.

During

1941 and 1942,

when Axis forces posed

their greatest threat to the British position in Egypt,

it became

clear that there was a pressing need for the establishment of a secure
alternative route across Central Africa and Southern Arabia to India
Sultan

and South Eastern Asia.

Said made land available

and air

strips were built at Salalah in Dhufar and on Masirah island.

The

later base was the more important and was used by the United States
Air Force as well as by the Royal Air Force (RAF).
Sultan

Said,

however,

saw

many

dangers

in

the

extension

of

Western influence and tried hard to preserve traditional ways of life.
The gates of the capital city, Muscat, were barred at dusk and all
foreign

visitors

Medicines,

radios,

needed
music,

a

visa

signed

dancing,

personally

spectacles,

by

trousers,

the

Sultan.

cigarettes

and books were all forbidden.
The Sultan's income was very low and the resources needed for
development projects just did not exist.

Any great increase in Oman's
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resources could come only from oil, so in the early 1960s exploration
work went ahead.

Production of oil began in 1967 but exports in that

year totalled only 2.9 million tons.

Oil revenues rose steadily from

$3. 6 million in 1967 to $124.1 million in 1971 (Petroleum Development,
1971, p. 13).
P.F.L.O.
Although the economic prospects had begun to improve, the politi
cal situation in Oman remained grim.

Small but increasing numbers of

the Sultan's subjects began to resent the traditional nature of his
life.

A ban that prevented the mountain people of Dhufar from working

for foreign oil companies was particularly resented, and on June 9,
1965 an oil company truck was blown up.

That date is generally

regarded as the beginning of the revolt in Dhufar led by the Dhufar
Liberation Front (DLF) (s ee Appendix K for DLF's Declaration).
Initially, however, the revolt was very small in scale and activity
was limited to sporatic attacks on the road linking Salalah with
Thamarit.
(Halliday,

Even when
1974,

Saudi Arabian help was given to the rebels

pp. 3 0-34),

the scope of their efforts did not

increase greatly and Sultan Said took few steps to crush the movement.
The situation began to change noticably in 1967.

In that year

the British withdrawal from the Aden Protectorate was completed and
the rebel movement came to possess a secure and friendly neighboring
refuge from which to operate.

The Port of Hanf just inside the

People's Democratic Republic of Y emen (PDRY) was used to supply arms
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and instructions and the scope of the rebel movement was quickly
extended.
The movement had a national character at first, until 1967 when
its direction was changed by the communists.
creation of Scientific-Socialism.

It then spoke of the

At the second conference of the

DFL, held in September 1968, it was decided to broaden the aims of the
organization, which was renamed the Popular Front for the Liberation
of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG).

The declared aim was to spread

Marxism throughout Oman and the Arabian Gulf

(see Appendix L).

Money, arms, instructions and supplies were provided to PFLOAG by
both China and the Soviet Union, and Cuba also provided some instruc
tors who were channelled into PDRY (Wilson, 1971, pp. 32-33).

By 1973

Soviet influence, however, edged out the Chinese (Luchsinger, 1973, P•
18).

Part of the reason was said to be that "they [PFLOAG leaders]

had been too closely identified with the discredited Lin Pia before
his death in 1971" (Pace, 1975, p. 1).
The rebels had three important strategic advantages.
was foreign aid.

The first

The second was a supply route, with a sanctuary that

the Omani forces could not attack without openly committing an act of
war against South Yemen.
rilla country.

The third was that Dhufar is an ideal guer

According to Charles Wakebridge (197 4), an expert on

the military aspect of contemporary Middle East affairs:
When flushed out from their normal areas by cleaning opera
tions • • • the hard pressed insurgents retire into Moon
Mountain, the high backbone ridge that runs from south-west
to north-east through the centre of Dhufar, where it is
extremely difficult for the Sultan's soldiers to follow
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them. The craggy nature of the mountains makes it hazardous
to use helicopters to airlift men into them. (p. 9)
PFLOAG's operations grew and the British finally came to grips
with the seriousness of their situation when they "approved" of Sultan
Said's son, the Sanhurst-trained Qabus, to take over in July 1970.
then large parts of Dhufar were under PFLOAG's control.

By

According to

Strategic Survey 1972 (The International Institute, 1973), "by 1970,
when Sultan Qabus bin Said seized power from his father in Oman,
PFLOAG controlled western Dhufar and all the populated areas except
the coastal Jurbail plain, from Salalah to Mirbat" (p. 32).
The core of PFLOAG was not known, although Qabus estimated it in
1973 to be 2,000 (Wakebridge, 1974, p. 9).

To match PFLOAG's growing

strength, Sultan Qabus sought to increase his own.

"By the year 1972

his [Qabus] armed forces had been increased from about 2,500 men to
about 10,000 and the number of their British officers from less than
100 to some 250" (The International Institute, 1973, P• 32).

It was

reported ("Oman Looks," 1975, p. SB) that one third of the enlisted
men in Qabus' army were Baluchi tribesmen recruited in Pakistan.
Against this background, it was the policy of Sultan Qabus to
persuade his neighbors that this was as much their struggle as it was
his, and to elect their support.

With this in mind, he visited almost

all of his Arab neighbors and Iran.

The Sultan was clearly successful

in his strategy of converting the campaign from a national to a
regional struggle.

However, the most massive support came not from an

Arab state but from Iran.
The Sultan had other military help that included Jordanian artil-
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lery personnel and officers from the United Arab Emirates; to contain
the insurgents, Saudi Arabian troops patrolled the desert along the
north-eastern edge of Dhufar.

Saudi Arabia also financed much of

Qabus' army.
One of the main reasons that PFLOAG had to be "wrapped up" soon
was that it continued to drain more than half of Oman's financial
revenues ("Oman Payments," 1974, p. 1154).

Midway through 1974 the

Sultan ordered a halt to new development expenditures until the defeat
of the PFLOAG ("Oman:

Sultan Halts," 1974, p. 1024).
The Shah's Intervention

Until 1972, the U.S. had been content to leave the counter
revolutionary war in Oman to the British, owing partly to the decades
of British experience in and control of the Sultanate and to the U.S.
reluctance to get involved in a Vietnam-type struggle in Arabia.

The

British withdrawal from the Gulf states was not intended to apply to
Oman under the contention that Oman had always been independent and
therefore the British would honor the Sultan's request for their
continued presence.

The total number of British personnel in Dhufar

was about 1,000 (Halliday, 1974, p. 345).

Despite their efforts, the

British were unable to make any headway against PFLOAG which still
held the initiatives in the struggle.

At about this time the Pentagon

sent a team to observe the war in Dhufar.

They came back recommending

against direct U.S. involvement ("Pentagon Assesses," 1975, p. 5).
this time the first Iranian military personnel were sent in.

By
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The large-scale invasion of
another year, in December 1973.

Iranian troops did not come for
Expansion of the SAF continued and

more Omanis were recruited to the army.
In late November-early December 1975, using the annual CENTO
naval exercises as a cover, Iranian troops were transferred from the
base at Chah Bahar to the Kuria Muria islands off the Dhufar coast.
The number of Iranian troops involved in the invasion of Dhufar varies
according to the source:

the Sultan claimed they numbered only

several hundred; PFLOAG claimed in 1974 that 11,000 were involved in
the first attacks; a U. s.

journal with close ties to the American

military establishment, Aviation Week and Space Technology, estimated
the number of Iranian military in Oman at 5,000 ( "Mideast Countries,"
1974, pp. 4 0-41).

Whatever the exact number, their presence clearly

marked a new stage in the protracted struggle in Oman.
The Shah's reasons for his substantial military involvement in
Oman were expressed in Business Week, in reply to a question about his
build-up of a huge arsenal.
Yes, because Iran has other frontiers. Our troops are in
volved in Oman at the request of the sultan and his govern
ment. If we were not able to send those troops there and if
Oman were taken over by those savage communists, what would
have happened to the whole Persian Gulf region?
And what
would happen to Japan, which depends for 90% of its oil on
the Persian Gulf? What would happen to Europe if that life
line was cut. (Taggiasco, 1975, p. 57)
The U.S. Role
The U. s.

role in Oman had become more and more substantial

towards the end of the war.

Sultan Qabus visited the United States in
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late 1974 and "reached an informal agreement with President Ford about
strengthening his defenses" ("Oman Looks," 1975, p. SB).

According to

the Arab Press Service (APS), the U.S. decision to aid Oman militarily
was taken after several visits to the Gulf area, including Oman, by
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William Colby and U.S.
Ambassador to Iran Richard Helms ("What's Behind," 1975, p. 1).
This U.S. decision to provide military aid to Oman was taken as a
complementary step to the role played by the Shah, within the context
of the Nixon Doctrine.

A U.S. diplomat in Muscat stated:

U.S. Government policy is to support the continued role of
the British here and let Oman rely on regional forces like
the Iranians. But we would be happy to supplement Oman's
traditional sources of military equipment. ("Oman Looks,"
1975, p. SB)
Among the 15,000 or so Americans that were reported to be in Iran
in various capacities were at least 1,500 "civilian" military advisors
working through such covers as Bell Helicopter International, and
another 650 or so official U. s. military advisors through the
Technical Assistance for Training
Advisory Groups (MMG).

(TAFT)

and

Military

Assistance

In contrast to the constant efforts of U.S.

officials to play down the U.S. role in Iran, it is pertinent to cite
an official Pentagon statement (Foreign Assistance, 1973) concerning
"Missions and Military Groups":
With respect to security assistance, represent the Secre
tary of Defense with the host country's military establish
ment.
Establish and maintain liaison between the U.S. defense
Establishment and that of the host country.
Establish and maintain a relationship of mutual trust and
confidence with the host country's military establishment.
Consistent with DoD policies, country objectives, and
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financial guidelines, develop security assistance plans and
programs in coordination with other elements of the country
team for submission to the unified commander.
Assist U. s. military departments and their subordinate
elements in arranging for the receipt, transfer and accep
tance of security assistance material, training, and other
services for the receipient countries.
Monitor and report on the utilization by host country of
defense articles and services provided as grant aid, as well
as personnel trained by the United States� • • •
Provide appropriate advisory services and technological
assistance to the host country on security assistance
matters. In developed countries, provide advisory services,
technical assistance, and training to develop a realistic
capability to plan, program, budget, and manage the military
resources of the host country. (p. 1200)
The United States request, early in 1975, to use the British
airstrip on the island of Masirah was followed by the sale of a sub
stantial quantity of arms to the Sultanate of Oman, to whom the island
belongs.
Reports from Oman suggest that the arms -- mainly anti-tank
weapons -- have been sold by the U.S. Government to help the
Sultan deal with a rebel uprising in Dhufar; but since the
rebels use camels, and not tanks, the sale appears rather
more significant, and is being interpreted here as a useful
"sweetener" to help the U.S. gain access to the now crucial
Masirah base. (Winchester, 1975, p. 7)
It was shortly after Qabus'

1975 visit to Washington that the

U.S. and Britain announced an agreement in principle to permit joint
use of the Masirah landing strip.

The obvious reason for the American

interest in using this island was for its use as a staging base for
American freight planes flying to the island of Diego Garcia.

Masirah

is also within easy striking distance of the Arabic states of the Gulf
and of Iran.
By

1974 the PFLOAG,

changed its tactics.

facing the new

military

situation,

had

It was divided into autonomous units, and in
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Oman, the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) was formed.
Given

the overwhelming military superiority

of

the

Sultan's

forces led by the British and aided by thousands of Iranian and
Jordanian troops, the PFLO was forced to evacuate the areas it held in
1975 and to move into PDRY.

On December 11, 1975 Sultan Qabus

announced complete military victory.
In addition to his military victory over the rebellion, Qabus
lifted most of his father's ludicrous restrictions.

A development

program was started to provide Oman with the roads, schools, clinics,
banks and airports.

This program weakened the rationale behind the

original revolt.
Fred Halliday (1978) rightly summarized the main reasons for the
rise and decline of PFLO:
The guerrillas were able to make the advances they did in
Dhofar because of two basic factors: the revolutionary wave
in southern Arabia that began with the North Yemeni revolu
tion of 1962 and spread into South Yemen and Dhofar; and the
ramshackle character of the Omani state. Both these condi
the Anglo-Iranian intervention, plus
tions have altered:
the deployment of oil revenues to strengthen the Omani
state, have transformed the content in which PFLO operates.
(p. 19)
Halliday (1978, p. 19) also pointed out a very crucial short
coming,

namely

PFLO's inability

to use Dhufar as a geographical

"spring-board" to spread the Rebellion to the more important northern
part of the country where 600,000 out of 750,000 people of Oman live.
This was due to a 550 mile separation of desert and to differences in
culture.

Therefore, Dhufar was the wrong base for extending revolu

tion into Omani heartlands and hence to the rest of the Gulf region.
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PFLO continues

to

exist,

at

least politically,

in PDRY.

number of its present members or supporters is not known.
future,

PFLO is

probably

The

As for the

hoping to keep afloat until the winds of

change in the region blow in its direction.

CONCLUSION
The Nixon Doctrine showed major change in American strategy to
cope with new world conditions.

The Truman Doctrine was an adequate

strategy for the politics of a weak world.

The Nixon Doctrine was a

strategy for the politics of a strong world.
Objectives of the Nixon Doctrine were changed in emphasis and in
priorities but not in fundamental content.

Changed tactics were also

an important part of the Doctrine, but are secondary to the strategic
adjustments.

The Doctrine was partially a response to the Vietnam

crisis, but only in the short-term sense that Vietnam precipitated the
Doctrine.

Basically, the Doctrine sought to decentralize U.S. respon

sibilities and some of its authorities to its allies and friends,
while assuring that the ultimate authority rested in the American
hands.
The Doctrine had several advantages.

It promised a reduction of

American forces abroad and a realignment of responsbilities without
terminating U. s. security commitments and obligations to friends and
allies.
business

It enhanced the posture and competitive position of American
abroad,

particularly

research and arms development.

corporations

involved

in

aerospace

It ensured continued compatibility in

weapons, doctrine, command and control between the United States and
its closest friends and allies to assume leadership responsibilities
within their regions that the United States could support, either
formally or indirectly.

But probably most of all it offered ingredi

ents that enabled the Nixon Administration to avoid domestic opposi
tion.
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However,

this "de-centralization" that was embodied in the Doc

trine inherited typical managerial problems.

It required the founda

tion of self-help and regional help among U.S. friends and allies.

It

needed a clear understanding and acceptance on the part of the U.

s.

allies

and

delicate.

friends

of

its very

objectives.

It was difficult

and

The U.S. had to strike a balance between doing too much and

thus preventing self-reliance,
mining self-confidence.
clarified and used.

and doing too little and thus under

Its generalities and ambiguities needed to be

Consequently, detailed programs and action plans

were required.
By nature,
and

strategy,

the Doctrine
rather

than

required "regional" thinking on policy

"global."

In retrospect,

the Doctrine's

main shortcoming probably was that its architects, namely Nixon and
Kissinger, were "globalists."

Globalists tend to view the world from

the strategic perspective of the cold war and they fail to give proper
weight

to

regional

social,

developing countries.

political

and

economic

problems

among

The implementation of the Nixon Doctrine neces

sitated the knowledge of what was possible within specific contexts.
Unless

the

U.

s.

policy

makers

had

a

good

understanding

of

local

factors that were operating, policies would be likely to fail or to be
counterproductive.

No

accurate

analysis

of

the

trade-offs

between

costs and benefits of different policies is attained without a deep
understanding of the specific configurations of power in given coun
tries.
In short, the Nixon Doctrine meant "de-centralization" of U.

s.
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responsibilities and authority; this required a "regionalistic"
approach, which neither Nixon nor Kissinger was equipped to handle.
This "regionalistic" thinking could be required nowhere more than in
the Gulf region, with its complexities and inticacies.
It is very difficult to assess the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf,
because it was vitiated by its own ambiguities and shortsights.

As it

turned out, and according to Eilts (1980), Nixon's ambassador to Saudi
Arabia, "the Nixon administration gradually fused several disparate,
but related elements into a kind of Gulf policy •

•

•

• Its keystone was

encouraging the Shah of I ran to assume the primary security role for
the

Gulf

by

providing

Iran

through extensive

hardware and training to do so" (p. 103).

sales,

with military

Therefore, the three key

words of the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf were:

"stability," the Shah,

and arms.
To the U.S.

policy

makers,

and

particularly to Kissinger,

meaning of "stability" emerges clearly:
U.S.

dominance

of

the

global

system

the

it increases or declines as
increases

or

declines.

Any

decline is part of a global challenge orchestrated by Moscow, which is
intent on "waging a permanent war for men's minds," and "mocking the
traditional standard of international law that condemns interference
in

a

country's

tions,

domestic

subversion."

affairs"

These

by sponsoring "upheavals,

conceptions

were

reflected

in

revoluthe

way

Kissinger perceived the threats to "stability" in the Gulf as "Soviet
intrusion and radical momentum."
Kissinger failed or chose not to recognize that by the time the
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British "withdrew" from the Gulf in 1971, the U.S. intrusion was far
more tangible and more evident than the Soviet one, and that an actual
danger is obviously worse than a potential danger.

The Gulf region

witnessed Portuguese, Dutch and British colonialism and intrusion for
centuries.

It is important at this juncture to recall Nixon's desire

to fill the British "vacuum" in the Gulf and his inability to do so
The U.S. dependence on Gulf oil was

because of domestic pressures.

growing while the Soviet oil production was rising.

In 1975 Kissinger

spoke of military intervention in the Gulf to secure the oil fields so
as to avoid oil "strangulation" of the West.

Perhaps, the greatest

shortcoming of the U.S. policy in the Gulf was its emphasis on hypo
thetical rather than potential threats.

This was evident in Washing

ton's lack of awareness of the stength of the opposition to the Shah
prior to 1978.

This

u. s.

m isperception of a ctual and potential

threats to "stability" in the Gulf set the stage for superpower
rivalry.
The disadvantages that the Shah experienced, in playing the major
role in the Nixon Doctrine,

certainly outweighed his advantages.

First, he suffered from lack of legitimacy, because his people saw him
as a "puppet" of the U.S. government.
tion's most effective ammunition.

This was probably his opposi

Second, he had accumulated a long

history of repression, corruption, dictatorship, and he lacked even
minimal domestic support.
sible tide of history.

Therefore, he was doomed by the irrever

Third, he had dreams of grandeur that did not

necessarily coincide with the Amer ican objectives in the Gulf.
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Fourth,

he

suffered

greatly

from

animosities

with Saudi Arabia.

Fifth, Saudi Arabia never accepted the role of "junior" partner in the
Gulf.

King Faisal regarded the eastern shore of the Gulf as Saudi

preserve and he was known to take a dim view of Iranian activities
there.

Significantly, the Saudis refer to the Gulf as the Arabian
According to

Gulf, a meaning transcending geography or semantics.

Eilts (1980), the Irani seizure of the three Arab islands "outraged"
King Faisal who called it "international piracy" (p. 90).
By 1971, when the U.S. decided to replace the British by the
Shah, there was no hard evidence to prove the existence of a "vacuum."
The U. s. initial reaction to the British withdrawal could be charac
terised as "panic" and "hysteria."
role to play.

Therefore, the Shah had no clear

Neither was there strong evidence to suggest that the

U.S. Government, in the "spirit" of the Nixon Doctrine, consulted the
Arab states before assigning the policeman's role to the Shah.
The quantity and quality of the U.S. arms sales to the Gulf, as a
main instrument of the Nixon Doctrine,

were initiated clearly by

commercial opportunities coinciding with the diplomacy of the Nixon
Doctrine.

These enormous arms sales clearly satisfied the "strong

appetite" of the American military-industrial complex, and accordingly
had positive effects on the U.S. balance of payments.

The sales also

provided the Shah with strong military muscle and gave an illusion of
security and stability in the Gulf.

However, these sales developed

great flaws that sharpened the downhill trend of the implementation of
the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf.

First, they destabilized the Shah's
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regime.

Second, they created a greater animosity between the Shah and
In his rush to get ahead and

the Arabs and particularly Saudi Arabia.

become the "Japan of West Asia," the Shah did not seem to notice that
Japan once had created more resentment than it could handle with its
ill-fated "Coprosperity sphere" in South East Asia; but to his neighbors

that

precious

parallel must
resources

have come to

financial

development programs.

and

mind.

Third,

human

they

from

diverted

socio-economic

Fourth, the sales had the unexpected effect of

luring the U. s. into a more direct role in the Gulf "security."

This

was contrary to the original purpose of the Nixon Doctrine.
The most successful
Oman.
the

application of the Nixon Doctrine came in

Using thousands of his troops, the Shah was able to "crush"

Dhufari

Rebellion

militarily

should be treated with caution:
spreading

militarily

outside

in

1975.

It

ently.

First, PFLO had no real chance of

of

Dhufar,

due

to

geography

still

exists,

at

least politically,

and

Future conditions could suddenly activate

support.

only in Oman but in the whole of the Gulf.

Fourth,

however,

and

to

Second, this Iranian undertaking did not finish PFLO perman-

culture.

Shah's

This success,

role

as

the

guardian

of

enjoys
their

PDRY' s

role not

Third, it precipitated the

"Western

and

U.S.

imperialism."

the Shah's intervention could be seen not in the context of

"maintaining

stability"

in

the

region,

but

as

an

exercise

of

his

hegemony.
The Nixon Doctrine appeared as the most sensible realistic and
versatile

path

that

post-Vietnam America could take.

However,

the
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volatile and vital Gulf area was the wrong site for its test.

The de

centralization nature of the Doctrine required confidence and maturi
ty.

The very young post-World War II American foreign policy experi

ence, perhaps, could not provide this requirement.
and mature manager could delegate authority.

Only a confident

Delegation of authority

requires a grasp of the intricacies of different parameters and their
delicate interactions.
The Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf seemed in theory, if not in execu
tion,

directed toward reasonably obtainable, rational goals.

It

failed nonetheless because it did not take fully into account the
complexities of Arab Gulf and Iranian politics.

Appendix A

WORLD ENERGY CONSUMPTION:

Aggregate Consumption
(10 15 Btu)

DISTRIBUTION BY SOURCE1 1950-72

1959

1 960

1965

1968

1970

1971

1 972

76.8

124.0

160.7

189.7

2 1 4.5

223.5

237.2

29.9

28.7
46.0
18.4

Per cent shares
Coal

Oil
Natural gas

Primary electricity (1)

44.2

5 5.7

35.8
13.5

28.9
8.9

6.4

6. 5

100.0

100.0

39.0

39.4
15.5

6.2
100.0

31.2

33.8

42.9
16.8

6.5
100.0

44.5

17.8

6.5
100.0

45.2
18.3

6.6
100.0

6.9

100.0

Average annual percentage rates of increase

Coal
Oil
Natural gas

Primary electricity

TOTAL

(1)

1950-60
2.5%
7. 1
9.4
4.9

4.9

1 960-72

1.8%

7.8
8.3
6.2

5.5

Comprised of geothermal, nuclear, hydro. For 1 972, the 6.9% figure in the table broke down
approximately as follows: geothermal, 0.03; nuclear, 0.7; hydro, 6.2.

Source:

Szyliowics & O'Neill,

1 975,

p. 65.
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Appendix B
ENERGY CONSUMPTION, OIL CONSUMPTION,
AND OIL IMPORTS: UNITED STATES,
WESTERN EUROPE, AND JAPAN, 1962 AND 1972

United
States
Energy consumption
(oil equivalent)
Oil consumption
Oil imports (a)
From Middle East/
North Africa (b)
From elsewhere

1962
Western
Europe

Japan

United
States

1972
Western
Europe

Japan

10 (b) barrels per day
23.27
10.23
2.12

13.96
5.24
5.19

2.25
o. 96
0.98

0.34
1.78

3.80
1.39

o. 72
0.26

35.05
15.98
4.74

23. 84
14.20
14.06

6.58
4.80
4.78

0.70
4.04

11.30
2.76

3.78
1.00

Percentage of energy consumption
Oil consumption
Oil imports (a)
From Middle East/
North Africa (b)
From elsewhere

44.0
9.1

37.5
37.2

42.7
43.6

45.6
13.5

59.6
59.0

73.0
72.6

1.5
7.6

27.2
10.0

32.0
11.6

2.0
11.5

47.4
11.6

57.4
15.2

Percentage of oil consumption
Oil imports (a)
From Middle East/
North Africa (b)
From elsewhere

20.7

99.0

102.1

29.7

99.0

99.6

3.3
17.4

72.5
26.5

75.0
27.1

4.4
25.3

79.5
19.4

78.6
20.9

Percentage of oil imports
From Middle East/
North Africa (b)
From elsewhere

16.0
84.0

73.2
26.8

73.5
26.5

14.9
85.1

80.4
19.6

7 8.9
21.1

(a)

Imports are "gross" rather than "net", that is, exports are not
deducted. Thus, they exclude product exports from West European
refineries. For Japan, excess of imports over consumption arises
because of small quantitites of product exports, refinery losses,
and (presumably) independent construction of the two series. By
showing gross rather than net imports, we overstate slightly the
degree of foreign dependence. The overstatement matters, if at
all, only in the case of Western Europe.

(b)

Includes negligible quantities from West Africa in 1962.

Source:

Waverman, 1974, P• 627.

Appena 1x L

WORLD CRUDE OIL PRUDUCTION 1960-1978
{bpd • barrels per aay)
Ha jor Areas und
Selected Countries

1960
Per
1,000

1970
1,000
Per

1973
1,000
Pt!r

1975
PH
1,000

�

cent

1976
1,000
Per

�

cent

1977
Per
1,000

1978 (4)
1,000
Per

�

cent

�

cent

�

cent

�

cent

�

cent

North America
United States
Canada

7,845
7,055
519
271

37.3
33. 5
2.5
,.3

11,373
9,648
1,305
420

25.1
21.3
2.9

11,452
9,189
1,798
465

20.5
16.5
3.2
.8

10,550

8,370
1,460
720

19.9
15. 8
2.7
I .4

10,398
8,154
1,339
897

17.9
14.0
2.3
1.5

10,546
8,244
I, 321
981

17.6
I 3. 8
2.2
1.6

11,232
8,701
I,324
1,207

18. 5
14.3
2.2
2.0

Central and South America
Venezuela (I)
Ecuador (I)
Other

3,470
2,854
7
609

16.5
13.6

4,758
3,703
5
1,050

10.5
8.2

4,666
3,364
204
1,098

8.4
6.0
.4
2.0

3,585
2,345
160
1,080

6.7
4.4
.3
2.0

3,553
2,301
187
1,065

6.1
4.0
.3
1.8

3,530
2,238
183
1,109

5.9
3.7
.3
1.8

3,548
2,166
202
1,180

5.8
3. 6
.3
1.9

Western Europe
United Kingdom
Norway
Other

289
2
0
287

1.4

375
2
0
373

.8

.7

0

.,

550
20
190
340

1.0

.8

370
2
32
336

.4

.6

776
244
279
253

1,3
.4
•5
.4

1,260
744
279
237

2.1
1.2
.5
.4

1,679
1,082
356
241

2.8
1.8
.6
.4

Africa
Algeria (I)
Libya (I)
Nigeria (I)
Gabon (I)
Other

289
185
0
18

J.4

86

.4

5,982
976
3,321
1,090
110
485

13.2
2.2
7.3
2,4
.2
I,I

5,902
1,070
2,187
2,053
150
442

10.6
J.9
3.9
3.7
.3
.8

4,990
960
1,480
1,795
225
530

9.4
1.8
2.8
3.4
.4
1.0

5,849
1,052
1,929
2,071
225
572

10.1
1,8
3.3
3. 6
.4
1.0

6,236
1,123
2,064
2,097
222
730

10.4
1.9
3.4
3.5
.4
I. 2

6,120
1,225
1,993
1,910
225
767

10.1
2.0
3.3
3.I
.4
I.3

Asia-Pacific
Indonea ia
Other

554
419
135

2.6
2.0
.6

1,340
855
485

3.0
1,9
1.1

2,272
I, 339
933

4.1
2.4
1.7

2,215
1,305
910

4.2
2,5
1.7

2,528
1,508
1,020

4.4
2.6
1.8

2,787
1,685
1,102

4.6
2.8
1,8

2,843
1,637
1,206

4.7
2.7
2.0

Kiddle Eaat
Saudi Arabia (1)
Kuwait (I)
Iran (1)
Iraq (I)
Abu Dhabi (1)(2)
Qatar (I)

5,269
1,319
1,696
1,057

25,I
6.3
8.I
5,0
4.6
0

30.7
8.4
6.6
8.4
3.4
I.5
.8

21,158
7,607
3,024
5,861
1,964
1,298
570
834

38.0
13.7
5.4
10.5
3.5
2.3
1.0
J.5

19,590
7,075
2,085
5,350
2,260
1,370
440
1,010

36.9
13.3
3.9
10.1
4.3
2.6
.8
J.9

22,235
8,367
1,918
5,940
2,442
I,952
498
I,138

38.3
14.4
3.3
10.2
4.2
3.4
.9
2.0

22,430
9,014
1,783
5,699
2,493
1,999
445
997

37.4
15.0
3.0
9.5
4.1
3.3
.7
1.1

2 I, 603
8,530
1,865
5,207
2,629
1,832
484
1,056

35.6
14.J
3.1

,3

13,937
3,798
2,983
3,831
1,563
691
367
704

Total Non-Co-uniat

17,716

84.3

37,765

83.3

45,820

82.3

41,695

78.5

45,331

78.1

46,789

78,0

47,025

77.5

Coaauniat World (3)
Soviet Union
Other

3,310
2,960
350

15,7
14, I
1.6

7,610
7,049
561

16,7
15. 5
1.2

9,865
8,420
1,445

I 5. I
2,6

11.1

11,650
9,630
2,020

21.9
18.I
3.8

13,213
NA
NA

22.0

12,728
10,934
2,279

21.9
18. 2
3.8

13,683
11,215
2,468

22.5
18.5
4.1

21,026

100.0

45,375

100.0

55,685

100.0

53,120

100.0

58,059

100.0

60,002

100.0

60,708

100.0

Mexico

(I)

Other

Total World

*

NA

-

969

0
173
55

*

2.9

*

0
1.4
.9

0
•I

-

.8

•9

*

2,3

*

J.6

*

.6

Member of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Figures for 1976, 1977 and 1978 include all United Arab Emirate countries.

(4)

Estimate.

(3)

8.6

4.3
3.0
.8

I,7

Production or percentage of production is negligible.
not ava llable

(2)

(I)

*

Includes Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations, China, Cuba and Yugoslavia.

Source:

Congressional Quarterly, 1979b, p. 75.
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Appendix D
WORLD PROVED OIL RESERVES
(Estimate at the end of 1976)
Billion
Barrels

Per Cent
of Total

North America
United States
Canada
Mexico

69
40
9
20

10.3
6.0
1.3

Central and South America
Venezuela (1)
Ecuador (1)
Other

22

2
6

3.3
2. 1
.3
.9

Western Europe
United Kingdom
Norway
Other

29
19
7
3

4.3
2.8
1. 0
.4

Africa
Algeria (1)
Liby a (1)
Nigeria (1)
Other

65

7
26
20
12

9.7
1. 0
3.8
3.0
1.8

Asia-Pacific
Indonesia (1)
Other

22
15
7

3.3
2.2
1. 0

Major Areas and
Selected Countries

3. 0

14

Middle East
Saudi Arabia (1)
Kuwait (1)
Iran (1)
Iraq (1)
United Arab Emirates (1)
Qatar (1)
Other

178
79
64
35
6
31
3

396

59.3
26.6
11.8
9.6
5.2
.9
4.6
.4

Total Non-Communist

603

90.3

Communist World (2)
Soviet Union
Other

40
25

65

9.7
4.0
3.7

668

100.0

Total World

(1) Member of Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC).
(2)

Includes Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations,
Cuba, China and Yugoslavia.

Source:

Congressional Quarterly, 1976b, p. 81.

Appendix E
PERSIAN GULF OIL IMPORTS AS A
PERCENTAGE OF OIL CONSUMPTION
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Appendix F
REVENUES FROM OIL OF THE GULF COUNTRIES
($ millions)
1971

1972

Saudi Ara bia

2,160

3,107

Ira n

1,870

Ira q

1974

1975

5,500

22,574

25,675

2,380

4,500

18,800

840

575

1,700

5,700 a

8,640 a

1,395

1,657

1,900

8,000 a

7,500 a

UAE

481

625

798

4,245

6,500

a

Qa ta r

198

255

409

1,362

1,690

a

Oma n

115

122

177

857

1,231

25

26

36

178

287

7 1 084

8 1 747

151014

611 616

701 623

Kuwa it

Ba hra in
TOTAL

a

1973

a

19,100

Estima ted, including revenues from sa les by sta te compa nies.

Source:

The Economic Intelligence, 1976, p. 3.

Appendix G
ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES' REVENUES, 1970-1978 (1)
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
Countrz
Saudi Arabia

Kuwait

Iran
Iraq

United Arab Emirates (2)
Qatar

Libya

Algeria

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

$1,200
895

$ 2,149
1,400

$ 3,107
1,657

$ 4,340
1,900

$22,600
7,000

$25,700
7,500

$ 33,500
8,500

$ 42,400
8,900

$ 35,800
9,200

233
122

431

551
255

900
410

5,500
1,600

6,000
1,700

7,000
2,000

9,000
2,000

8,000
2,000

1,136
521

Venezuela
Indonesia

Total

198

1,295
325

1,766
350

185

284

411
1,406

Nigeria

1,944
840

$7,729

2,380
575

4,100
1,840

17,500
5,700

18,500
7,500

22,000
8,500

21,300
9,600

1,598
700

2,300
900

6,000
3,700

5,100
3,400

7,500
4,500

8,900
4,300

429

950

3,300

3,850

4,500

5,700

-----1.t600

$115,000

$127,800

$118,300

915
1,702

1,174
1,948

$11,979

$14,374

2,200
2,670

$22,510

8,900
8,700

$90,500

6,600
7,500

$93,350

8,500
8,500

9,600
6,100

(1)

In N ovember 1973, Ecuador became a member of the OPEC, and Gabon an associate member; they are not included in the
above chart.

(2)

A federation of the Persian Gulf states was fotmed in 1971. Revenue figures for 1975 to 1978 included all UAE
production; figures for 1973 and 1974 include only Abu Dhabi and Dubai; figures before 1973 are for Abu Dhabi
alone, which is the largest oil producer among the members of UAE.

Source:

20,500
9,800

8,600
5,000
8,200
5,600

Congressional Quarterly, 1979b, P• 76.
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.....
0

Appendix H
MONETARY RESERVES1 MIDDLE EAST OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES*
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Iran

$

208

$

621

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

960

$ 1,236

$ 8,383

$ 8,897

$ 8,833

$12,266

$23,152

1972

1971

1970

Countrr

$

Iraq

462

600

782

1,553

3,273

2,727

4,601

6,996

Kuwait

203

288

363

501

1,399

1,655

1,929

1,929

2,990

Saudi Arabia

662

1,444

2,500

3,877

14,285

23,319

27,025

30,034

19,407

*

A country's international reserves consist of its reserves in gold, SDRs (special drawing rights which are
unconditional international reserve assets created by the International Monetary Fund), its reserve position in the
Fund (unconditional assets that arise from a country's gold subscription to the Fund's use of a member's currency to
finance the drawing ■ of others) and its foreign exchange (holdings by monetary authorities -- such as central banks,
currency boards, exchange stabilization funds and Treasuries -- of claims on foreigners in the form of bank deposits,
Treasury bills, government securities and other claims usable in the event of a balance of payments deficit).

Source:

Congressional Quarterly, 1979b, p. 83.
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Appendix I
U.S . TRADE IN CRUDE OIL
(bpd barrels per day)

Year
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

*

Exports
Thousand
bpd

Imports
Thousand
bpd

126
110
90
96
79
74
55
38
33
79
137
11
8
8
8
5
5
3
3
5
74
5
3
14
1

268
353
422
488
490
575
649
658
781
937
1,022
953
964
1,019
1,047
1,126
1,132
1,203
1,238
1,225
1,129
1,293
1,408
1,323
1,680
2,222
3,244
3,422
4,105
5,400
6,690

*

2
3
6
8
50

Less than 500 barrels per day.

Source:

Congressional Quarterly, 1979b, P• 79.

Net Imports
Thousand
bpd
142
243
332
392
411
501
594
620
748
858
885
942
956
1,011
1,039
1,121
1,127
1,200
1,235
1,220
1,055
1,288
1,405
1,309
1,679
2,222
3,242
3,419
4,099
5,392
6,640
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Appendix J
OPEC DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS FROM
FREE-WORLD INDUSTRIAL NATIONS

20 - Billions of D ollars,
1979 Imports
' Imports from U.S. ---------1
15---- �
---�

Imports from Other Sources

10

0

Kuwait

Source:

United
Arab
Emirates

Iraq

Congressional Quarterly, 1979b, p. 85.

Saudi
Arabia

Iran
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Appendix K
DLF DECLARATIONS
A revolutionary vanguard has emerged from
Arab people of Dhofar !
among you and, believing in God and country, has taken upon itself the
task of liberating this country from the rule of the despotic Al Bu
Said Sultan whose dynasty has been identified. with the hordes of the
British imperialist occupation. Brothers! This people has long and
bitterly suffered from dispersion, unemployment, poverty, illiteracy
and disease - those pernicious weapons introduced under the protection
of the bayonets of British Imperialism, and used against the Dhofaris
by the government of the Sultans of Muscat.
Arab people of Dhofar! You bear witness to this state of affairs and
have all suffered from this absurd policy. God has wished us life and
they wish death.
But the will of God is the will of Right which
should prevail over this part of the great Arab fatherland.
Fighting masses of Dhofar ! In the name of the free martyrs who fell
in the battleground of dignity and honour; in the name of all the
afflicted and the widowed and all those humiliated by the prevailing
corruption and perversion; in the name of the Arab nation, whose sons
are fighting in every part of their land - we appeal to the true Arab
spirit in you to close ranks of the Dhofar Liberation Front to form an
impregnable dam against despotism.
The government of the stooge Said Bin Taimur has enlisted the services
of an army of Shu 'ubi mercenaries to frustrate the goals of Arab
liberation in this country; but the DLF will be like blazing fire
against it in every part of the country. This same spiteful Shu-ubi ·
(i.e., foreign, non-Arab) army has managed to obstruct the aims of the
revolution in Oman; however, the Free Will which derives its strength
from the will of God is bound to overcome. We vow to God that we
shall teach this army a lesson it will never forget - the same lesson
taught to the imperialist armies in Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Yemen.
(June 9, 1969)

Source:

P.F.L.O.A.G. [No other information available.]
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Appendix L

THE PLATFORM OF THE
SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE

P.F.L.O.A.G.

September, 1968

1.

To insist on organized revolutionary armed struggle as the only
way to overcome imperialism, reactionaries, the bourgeoisie and
feudalism.

2.

To change the name of the Liberation Front of Dhufar to the
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf and to
link the struggle in Dhufar with that of the peoples in the other
parts of the Occupied Arab Gulf.

3.

The PFLOAG denounces the fake U nion of Arab Gulf Emarates and
asserts that the only revolutionary and effective step towards
achieving the unity of the Gulf is through the unity of the
revolutionary popular forces.

4.

The PFLOAG resolves to adopt scientific socialism as a theoretical
guide for the struggle of the poor masses and as a scientific
method of analysis.

5.

The PFLOAG extends full support to the Palestinian people repre
sented by its armed vanguard.

6.

The PFLOAG supports the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America
in their struggle against world imperialism and bourgeois and
feudal regimes, and denounces the racist regime in R hodesia and
racial discriminiation in the U.S.

Source:

P.F.L.O.A.G. [No other information available.]

Appendix M
THE EIGHT GULF PRODUCERS
Area

Population
(est.)

1973 Oil
Production
(barrels/da:z:)

1974 Oil
Reserves
(bill. of brls)

Iran

635,000

33,000,000

5,895,000

65

$4.4

$14-$22

Saudi Arabia

830,000

7,603,000

up to 460

$5.5

$19-$27

Iraq

173,000

10,500,000

1,980,000

29

$1.3

$4.6-$7.0

6,200

900,000

3,013,000

64-73

$2.0

$7-$8

36,000

200,000

1,500,000

25-26

n.a.

n.a.

32,000

110,000

1,305,000

21

$0.75

$4-$6

231

225,000

64,000

0.375

n.a.

$0.34

6,000

115,000

570,000

6.5

82,000

750,000

295,000

5

(s9. mi.)

Kuwait

United Arab Emirates
Abu Dhabi
Bahrain
Qatar
Oman

Source:

5,500,0008,400,000

Earnings from Oil Exports
1973
1974 Estimates
(billions of dollars)

$0.3

$1.5

$0.185

$0.5

Foreign Policy, 1975, p. 72,

......
......

Appendix N
PERSIAN GULF CRUDE OIL PRICES (1)
(dollars per barrel)

1. Posted price (2)
2. Royalty (3)
3. Production cost
4. Profit for tax purposes
(l -(2+3))
5. Tax (4)
6. Government revenue (2+5)
7. Cost of equity oil (2+6) (5)
8. Cost of participation oil (5)
9. Weighted average cost (5)
10. Weighted government revenue
(9-3)

Jen. l,
1973

Jan. l,
1974

$2.591
.324
.100

$11-651
1.456
• 100

2.167
1.192
1.516
1.616
2.330
1.794

10.095
5.552
7.008
7.108
10.835
9.344

1.694

9.244

Percent
Change,
1973-74

Jan. l,
1975

Percent
Change,
1974-75

Jan. l,
1976

-

$11.251
2.250
.120

3.6
+ 54.5
+ 20.0

$12.376
2.475
.120

366.0
366.0
362.0
340.0
365.0
421.0

8.881
7.549
9.799
9.919
10.460
10.240

+
+
+

+ 446.0

10.120

+

+ 350.0
+ 349.0
+
+
+
+
+
+

-

Percent
Change,
1975-76

Jan. l,
1977

Percent
Change,
1976-77

-

$12.995
2.599
.120

+ 5.0
+ 5.0

+ 9.9
+ 10.0

12.0
36.0
39.8
39.5
3.5
+ 9.6

9.781
8.314
10.789
10.909
11.510
11.270

+
+
+
+
+
+

10.l
10.1
10.l
10.0
10.0
10.1

10.276
8.735
11.334
11. 454
12.085
11.836

+
+
+
+
+
+

9.5

11.150

+ 10.2

11.716

+ 5.1

-

5.1
5.1
5. l
5.0
5.0
5.0

(l)

Prices shown are for Saudi Arabian light crude oil 34 degree API (American Petroleum Institute) gravity. Saudi light is used as a
standard for Persian Gulf crude because it is the largest single type of crude produced there and represents a good average between
higher-priced low-sulfur crude and lower-priced heavier oil.

(2)

The so-called "posted price" is a fictitious, artificially high price set by oil-producing countries for the purpose of producing the
revenues -- royalties and taxes -- they receive froa oil companies.

(3)

The Saudis royalty was fixed at 12.5 per cent of the posted price for the 1973 and 1974 dates, and as 20 per cent for the 1975 date.

(4)

The Saudi tax was fixed at 55 per cent of the profit for tax purposes ( line 4) for the 1973 and 1974 dates, and at 85 per cent for the
1975 date.

(5) The oil companies pay two different prices, and the
for participation oil. Participation oil is oil in
the country. The oil companies -- because of their
tion of a cost something lees than the market rate,
Source:

Congressional Quarterly, 1979b, p. 80.

weighted average cost per barrel falls between the cost for equity oil and the cost
which the oil-producing country has part ownership in the oil companies operating in
exploration and development roles -- have a right to a certain percentage of produc
which also is figured in the weighted average cost.
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